

The Catholic University Bulletin.

Vol. XV.

June, 1909.

No. 6.

THE NEW PHILOSOPHY IN FRANCE—A CRITICISM.

In two previous articles ¹ we have outlined with all possible impartiality and precision, although briefly, the principles of the New Philosophy. So far we have not entered into their applications to the various problems of philosophy and to their solutions. It would have been necessary for that purpose to go through the whole field of philosophy. In the course of our criticism, however, we shall have occasion to determine more exactly the meaning of these principles and to discuss more effectively their value.

The purpose of this article and of the following is precisely to examine the value of these principles. Our criticism will be as frank as our exposition has been accurate. We shall point out the partial truth which the New Philosophy contains; it is to be found especially in its criticism of the pseudo-scientific materialism and empirical associations which dominated the latter part of the nineteenth century and found in Herbert Spencer its chief exponent; in its emphasis of the importance in the life of thought of certain elements which some philosophers had a tendency to neglect; in some very brilliant psychological analyses which have had a great share in the success of the new School. In the same way we shall indicate what we consider to be the errors of the New Philosophy. To our mind,

¹ Cf. *The Catholic University Bulletin*, April, 1906; March, 1908.

they are in its principles; not indeed that there is no element of truth in them, but that they are false in the particular and original sense in which the New Philosophy understands them, as well as in the place and function which it gives them in the structure and growth of philosophy.

The New Philosophy, as has been already said, is based on two fundamental theories which complete each other; a theory of science and its value, and a theory of intuition; these theories implying as a first principle the primacy of the will over the intellect and leading to a particular conception of the relations between Science and Philosophy as well as to a new conception of the chief notions and principles of Metaphysics.

Our present criticism will be limited to these two theories and will touch the other points only in so far as will be necessary for the full discussion of these theories.²

I. THE VALUE OF SCIENCE.

The New Philosophy has its starting point, negative though it be, in the criticism of what is called the intellectualistic conception of science. It holds that scientific reflexion and processes are unable to put us in mental contact with reality; that their results cannot succeed in explaining or even in representing it; that these results indeed do not express truth but they furnish us with means of action. It is on these principles that the New Philosophy bases its charge of inability to know the truth against intellectualism.³

Rightly so or not, the New Philosophy in this criticism of our scientific knowledge pretends to be in agreement with the scientific movement that has taken place more especially in the latter part of the nineteenth century. We have alluded to it in our first article; but in order to judge with more competency

² The reader will find a brief summary and an excellent criticism of the notion of truth in the New Philosophy in J. de Tonquédec's *La Notion de Vérité dans la Philosophie Nouvelle*. Paris, 1908.

³ It is the same conception of science and truth that is at the basis of Pragmatism. It is that accepted by W. James in his recent book, *Pragmatism*. Cf. Lect. II, pp. 53-63, and Lect. VI, "The notion of truth."

and with more interest to the reader, the true meaning of this movement and to show that it implies neither the principles nor the solutions which the New Philosophy and even some scientists think it implies, we deem it useful to sketch this movement briefly, as far as it is concerned with the value of scientific method and solutions, and as exactly as is possible for one who is not a specialist in the matter but who has studied it mainly from the standpoint of its philosophical significance. The clear exposition, in special publications, by some of the leading scientists, of the data of the problem and their solution of it, facilitate not a little the writer's task. The works of Poincaré and Duhem⁴ may be especially mentioned. As physical sciences have been the more direct object of this criticism (although Poincaré has also turned his attention to the value of mathematical sciences) and as these sciences are more closely connected with reality we shall confine our exposition to them.

In a general way, physical theory, until the nineteenth century, had been considered as an explanation of reality; it claimed to put the human mind in possession of the efficient causes and constitutive elements of material phenomena. Observation ascertained the facts and discovered their mutual and necessary relations or laws; then, comparing all these different laws, the human mind attempted to reduce them until it had found the elements whose various relations constituted the essence of objective nature and regulated its course. Physical theory therefore was considered as essentially explanatory; on the other hand, these simple elements were identified with material or representative entities: material points and motion, laws of local change through impact, pressure, attraction and repulsion; it was a mechanical theory. These elements were

⁴H. Poincaré: *La Science et l'Hypothèse*, Paris, 1902; *La Valeur de la Science*, Paris, 1905.

P. Duhem: *La Théorie physique, son objet et sa structure*, Paris, 1906. Cf. also, A. Rey: *La Théorie de la physique chez les physiciens contemporains*, Paris, 1907. This latter book contains a good exposition of the divers conceptions of the physical theories and many interesting remarks concerning their value. But the author is a positivist. He professes to ignore the principles of Metaphysics and yet uses them unconsciously at every step.

accepted as the very matter, causes and laws of nature, its qualities and action. Physical theory was thus given as an objective reproduction of nature.

It is especially with the development of thermo-dynamics based on the principle of the mechanical theory of heat generalized into the principle of conservation of energy, and on the principle of Carnot-Clausius; also with the conception of energy, which, according to many, flows as a consequence from them, that the notion of physical theory was changed. Abstract notions and schematic constructions were substituted for material elements and explanatory reproductions; the concept of energy for the concept of matter and motion; and magnitudes instead of being represented and measured geometrically as special changes relatively to a given point, were represented and measured algebraically, as numbers relatively to a conventional scale. So physics, abandoning the principles and elements of mechanics, accepted those of thermo-dynamics. It no longer claimed to be immediately a systematic explanation and objective representation of nature and of its material phenomena but rather to furnish a method of representation that would enable us to take possession, by prevision and control, of natural forces. Even those, who remained faithful to the principle of mechanics, modified their notion of its elements and a new conception of the nature and value of the physical theory was accepted. This new conception differs, indeed, according to the physicists who accepted it, taking divers aspects and giving divers interpretations to the question of the relations of Physics with reality; hence we must carefully distinguish their several views regarding the nature and value of the physical theory according as it is considered as a method of research or as an expression of results,—a point that has not been sufficiently noted by the New Philosophy and on which we shall insist further on. In its general character, however, this conception substitutes representation for explanation as the function of physical theory.⁵

This new view was inaugurated by Rankine in England, elaborated by E. Mach and Oswald in Germany; Clerk Maxwell and

⁵ Cf. A. Rey, *op. cit.*

W. Thomson (Lord Kelvin) in England have also given a large place to the representation in physics by the introduction of "mechanical models." Poincaré and Duhem in France, with certain differences, however, have insisted on the character of representation in physical theory.

According to Rankine,⁶ two periods must be distinguished in the construction of physical theory. In the first period the relations between the natural and experimental facts are observed and expressed in propositions or formal laws; in the second the formal laws of a class of phenomena are systematically reduced and the physicist looks for the simplest system of principles from which all the formal laws can be deduced; this system of principles constitutes the physical theory. Not being imposed immediately by experience, this theory may be built in divers ways: either a class of objects is defined through the common properties of this object as perceived by our senses, without the use of any hypothesis, and designated by a name or symbol: this is the abstract method; or this class of objects is defined through some hypothesis suggested by analogy with other laws already known; then the agreement between the consequences deduced from such an hypothesis and experience verifies the definitions: this is the hypothetical method. The former is the true method, says Rankine. By applying it, we reach the conception of energy as a property common to all physical phenomena; all physical phenomena are then varieties of one and the same energy, homogeneous and subject to mathematical measurement. In this conception physical theory becomes a natural classification, a method of representation of the phenomena and of their relations.

E. Mach⁷ exposes his views of the value of science in connection with his system of philosophy which is phenomenist, sensualist and evolutionist. According to him, the history of scientific progress has passed through three periods: the first is the experimental period, which merely observes facts and

⁶ J. McQuorn Rankine: *Outlines of the Science of Energetics*. (*Proceedings of the Philosophical Society of Glasgow*, vol. III); cf. also, Rey, *op. cit.*

⁷ *Die Analyse der Empfindungen; Die Mechanik in ihrer Entwicklung, historisch-kritisch dargestellt*. Leipzig, 1883.

groups them according to more or less empirical principles. In the deductive period the mind substitutes for facts some abstract concepts out of which reality is reproduced systematically; this is, in Physics, the period of "mechanicism." The third period is the formal or perfect period; here the end of science is not to reproduce reality but to build a system that economizes our efforts of thought,—for the great law of the human mind is the law of the economy of effort; energetics realize this period in physics.

According to Mach, sensation is the only reality and it is something essentially relative. The object of science is to determine the relations upon which our sensations depend; it is an analysis of our sensations. Physics is the science that studies the external relations of our sensations; it became truly scientific the day it attempted to replace experience by a type of the facts that would be easy to handle. This copy is obtained through a systematization guided by the principle of economy of effort, a principle formed in the human mind by the collective experience of the race and confirmed by its practical results. It is the fundamental principle of the human mind and the source of progress; the value of a physical theory is measured by it. The best theory is that which represents the greatest number of relations with the least possible effort.

So, in this system, science appears to have primarily a pragmatic value. This view has also been mentioned by Oswald.⁸

With the English school of modern physicists, Faraday, Clerk Maxwell, and W. Thomson (Lord Kelvin), mechanicism seems to dominate again in Physics and the physical theory seems, at bottom, to be an explanation of reality. The original part in their conception is the place given to the mechanical models. For them, for Thomson especially, a physical theory is not truly understood until it has been illustrated; and this illustration is obtained through mechanical models; the more analogous to the phenomena this model is, the better the theory is understood. A line with its direction and magnitude is illustrated by a vulcanized rubber tube, rigidity by a piece of

⁸ "Theorie und Praxis" in *Zeitschr. des Oesterrischen Ingenieur und Architecten-Vereins*, 1905.

steel, flexibility by a thread of cotton, etc.; again, laws are illustrated by a combination of balls, springs, etc., or algebraic symbols. These models are not used to satisfy our reason but to please the imagination; hence, they are not subject to the laws of logic. Thus one group of phenomena may be represented by one model, another group by another model, without any relation to the former or even in contradiction to it; or, again, the same group may be represented by different models. It seems at first that in such a conception, physical theory, by reason of the place given to the model in its formation, is reduced to a mere scheme of representation and to a mere practical value. We shall see, however, that such a judgment would be rather superficial.

The work of Prof. P. Duhem deserves a very special mention. By his undisputed familiarity with the problems of mechanics and thermo-dynamics, by the depth of his thought and the extension of his scientific erudition, Professor Duhem has won for himself a place among the masters of contemporary Physics. In a recent book he wrote on this very subject of the physical theory, he examines its object, formation and value; it is this work that we shall summarize presently.⁹

According to Professor Duhem, the object of a physical theory is not to explain but to represent as simply and as exactly as possible through some few principles the different laws obtained in experimentation. Four successive operations concur in its formation: (1) the determination of the elementary properties and their representation by mathematical symbols which will be in relation to them as a sign to the thing specified; (2) the connection of these mathematical symbols by some few principles, largely arbitrary, but subject to the law of contradiction, and also the formulation of hypotheses; (3) the deduction from these principles of all their possible consequences through mathematical analysis; (4) the comparison of these conclusions with the experimental laws to be represented. The physical theory is precisely verified by this conformity with experience. Its usefulness consists in this that it makes possible the intellectual

⁹ *La Théorie physique, son objet et sa structure.* Paris, 1906.

economy of thought and furnishes a classification of laws, and that moreover it develops a certain divination of the real affinities between things that will tend progressively to change this classification into a natural classification and to allow the prevision of new laws. Therefore, says Professor Duhem, in spite of its utility, the theory of illustrative representation of the English physicist should not be accepted, for, although our hypotheses may be to a certain extent arbitrary, they must, however, always respect the law of non-contradiction which common sense imposes on all our scientific reflexions. Physical theory is neither explanatory nor merely illustrative, it is a representation built according to the law of non-contradiction and order, and it attempts to furnish a classification of a group of experimental laws.

In order to connect in a logical order its experimental laws, theoretical Physics must use the language of the most logical science, viz., mathematics. But under what conditions can a physical property be represented by a mathematical symbol? Only quantity can be expressed in numbers and physical properties are not quantities but qualities; and quality, although admitting of different degrees of intensity, is not reducible to quantity. In order to use the language of algebra in physics, the physicist then will be obliged to substitute for the quality a numerical symbol, *e. g.*, for heat, that of temperature; to this symbol he will add some concrete process apt to obtain the scale of intensities and the knowledge of this scale will allow him to give a physical meaning to the algebraic propositions; in this manner, for instance, the divers quantities or dilatations of mercury under the influence of a certain more or less intense degree of heat will furnish us with a thermometer that will enable us to determine numerically the different degrees of the intensity of heat. We do not add the intensities of heat but the numbers measuring the expansion produced by them.

Now, how shall we realize the successive operations that are to give us the physical theory? We have first to determine by a method of analysis and reduction the primary qualities, a determination that will always remain more or less provisional and

relative. After this determination of the primary qualities and of their mathematical symbols, we have to study the relations existing between the symbols; here we have the use of hypotheses,—of these we shall speak later on. Then comes the question of mathematical development. The purposes of the mathematical deduction is to teach us that by virtue of all the hypotheses accepted, given circumstances will produce certain consequences. But how are we to represent these mutual relations of facts or laws? And what is the nature of the facts used by the mathematical deduction and of the laws represented? The circumstances observed through experiment form the “practical fact”; translated into their mathematical symbols, they form a “theoretical fact.” This translation is never absolutely adequate but only more or less exact. To say that the temperature of a body is 10° or 9.99° or 10.01° is to formulate three different and incompatible theoretical facts; and yet the three correspond to one and the same practical fact if our thermometer is not precise to the $1/50$ of a degree. Again, experimental laws are the result of experiment, and experiment in Physics, although an exact observation of concrete facts, is at the same time an interpretation of them through the substitution, for these concrete data, of symbolical representations that correspond to them according to the theories antecedently accepted. So, in Physics, theory precedes scientific observation. Again, instruments of observation are constructed on the plan suggested by the theory that has been accepted. Physical laws, therefore, are only approximate, relative and provisory.

Now, what is the value of physical theories, or rather, what is the value of the hypotheses upon which these theories are based? The physicist does not find them either in Metaphysics, since they are applied not to things themselves but to their symbols; or through experience and induction, although experience and common sense may sometimes exclude or modify those that have been accepted. Where then will he get them? In his selection, the physicist is first of all guided by the law of non-contradiction; the different hypotheses must not be contradictory. Moreover, they must be selected in such a way that he may, through mathematical deduction, draw from them consequences

that will represent with sufficient approximation all experimental laws. Outside of these rules the physicist is free; yet freedom does not mean arbitrary caprice. The physicist belongs to an epoch scientifically characterized so that his freedom is guided and sometimes controlled by present circumstances. In reality, physical theory is the result of a slow and progressive evolution to which each age brings its share of enlightenment; the hypothesis of gravitation developed gradually from the time of Aristotle and the Greek philosophers to the days of Newton. Such are, according to Professor Duhem, the object, the formulation and the value of physical theory.

It is partly under the influence of this scientific movement interpreted by them, both as an affirmation of contingency and freedom in the field of science and as a reaction against the usurpations of logical necessity in the process of thought, that Professor Bergson and his disciples, Professor Le Roy especially, have developed their criticism of intellectualism in general, of science and its value in particular. We explained their principles¹⁰ in our first article; we summarize them here briefly. According to Professor Bergson, all our knowledge has its starting point in the data of common sense; but if common sense puts us in contact with reality, it represents that reality to us not in its immediate and pure data but as the result of a certain interpretation. Common sense is essentially directed to the satisfaction of our daily needs; therefore it perceives reality under this aspect and selects in it what is useful for our ordinary action. Its data for us do not primarily represent reality as it is in itself, but in its relations to our needs. This is a first deformation of reality. What is then the value of science? Science does not represent pure reality. First of all, it has its starting point in common sense which is an interpretation rather than a representation of reality; again, its primary purpose is not to make the data of common sense more precise in order to know them more deeply but to express them so as to use them better, to dominate nature and foresee its course more surely. It is under these influences, Professor Bergson says, that we

¹⁰ *The Catholic University Bulletin*, April, 1906.

substitute discontinuity for continuity, quantity for quality, numerical multiplicity, geometrical extension and homogeneous time for concrete and real duration, measure for motion, etc. What then regulates our scientific concepts is not knowledge but practical use. We select in common sense these data that are of interest for our actions and we express them in laws and theories formed according to this criterion.

Professor Le Roy has summed up his conceptions in the following propositions.¹¹ "The facts our laws must connect together are, in the measure in which they are scientific and not mere crude facts, made by the scientist as far as the decrees of common sense allow it; laws themselves are either conventional definitions or practical directions (*recettes pratiques*); as dogmatic definitions, and only as such, they can be general and rigorous; but then they cease, properly speaking, to be subject to verification; as practical directions they are not true but efficacious; they do not possess interest for our knowledge so much as for our action; they enable us to use rather than to discover the order of nature.

"The results of positive science are contingent (from the point of view of knowledge): (1) because they rest upon principles of common sense, without which the fundamental definitions are mere vicious circles; (2) because they proceed from a discursive parcelling out (*morecelage*) of nature by ourselves when, however, analysis shows that each act of parcelling implies at bottom the whole of science.

"Science has a value: (1) from the standpoint of our practical action either industrial or discursive; (2) from the standpoint of knowledge, in this sense that each one of its results furnishes us with a starting point for a critical study of reality; but science is neither autonomous as a whole nor necessary in its details."¹²

Such is the position taken by the New Philosophy in this problem of the value of science. This criticism of Intellectual

¹¹ *Bulletin de la Société française de philosophie*, 1901.

¹² Cf. in W. James' *Pragmatism*, the same conception of common sense, science and truth. Lect. II, pp. 190-194; Lect. VI, "Pragmatism's conception of Truth."

alism is one of its important elements since it is used as a principle upon which to establish not only the distinction between philosophy and science but also their separation and to judge of the value of our concepts as elements of true knowledge; and moreover as a starting point to put in new terms the various problems of Philosophy and to advocate intuition as the true method of Philosophy.

This then is the position we have now to examine. At first glance it seems that according to the different conceptions exposed above, scientific theories have merely a subjective, symbolical or practical value. In reality this conclusion is the result of a superficial view. We do not deny that among scientists there may be some who admit it, but we maintain that in their case, this opinion is the consequence, not of scientific considerations, but of the philosophical principles antecedently accepted by them. We maintain that the divers scientific notions, facts, concepts, laws or theories, considered in themselves, analysed in the fulness of their data, elements and meaning are the source and the object of a true knowledge,—of a knowledge truly representative and, thus far, explanatory of reality, although more or less adequate and subject to progress;—of a knowledge that has its starting point as well as its rule in the objective reality, not in our mind; that scientific notions have primarily and immediately a value for knowledge and only consequently a value for action and use. We do not, indeed, deny that our mind plays its active part in this knowledge and in its progress; but we maintain that the part played by the mind consists in furnishing means and not in creating results; that even in this coöperation, the mind is not left to its caprice or choice but is always regulated first in its general direction, and then more and more closely in its particular determinations by objective reality; that it is therefore by an artificial interpretation of the scientific movement as well as by a false analysis of common and intellectual knowledge that the New Philosophy has been led to its conception of Science as having a merely artificial and provisory value as knowledge.

It is admitted by all that science,—we speak especially of physical science—has its starting point in the data of experience

or facts, that it attempts to express these data through *laws* and to systematize these laws through *theories*. Let us examine these successive steps in the formation of our scientific knowledge.

As to the facts or data of experience,—these data have their source in experience or common sense; but, we are told, the scientist sees them in another way than the ordinary or ignorant man and there is an essential difference between the *crude and practical fact* and the *scientific fact*. The crude fact is simply seen by the ignorant; the scientific fact is *made or created* by the scientist who selects among the data of common sense those that appear more interesting and better adapted to his dominion over, and his foresight of, the course of nature.

Professor Poincaré forcefully and rightly protests against such a proposition, against what he calls “M. Le Roy’s Nominalism.” He maintains that there is no essential difference between the crude and the scientific fact; the latter being simply the translation of the former into handy—we should say, a precise language.¹³ Using the example of the eclipse proposed by Professor Le Roy, he shows that the crude fact expressed by the plain man in the sentence, “it is dark,” and the scientific fact expressed by the scientist in the formula, “the eclipse took place at 9 o’clock,” are one and the same fact expressed in two different ways. There is not on the part of the scientist a creation but a more precise expression of the fact. In what then, does the activity of the scientific mind consist? This activity does not exert itself over the facts in order to transform or interpret them but it looks for the means better adapted to a deeper and more precise perception and observation of these

¹³ By this expression “science, properly speaking, is not true, but handy,” Prof. Poincaré seems to admit the very opinion which he attempts to refute. However, explaining his thought more fully, he says that this convenience in science is and will be found to be “the same for all men.” Even this supplementary explanation does not seem to us to remove all subjectivism. But if, as Prof. Poincaré expresses it, scientific convenience is not due to chance, it has some foundation, and if it is the same for all men, it must be based on a universal and necessary relation between the mind and its objects, therefore on an objective reality. Prof. Poincaré himself speaks of the “natural and hidden relationship” which connects the divers facts together. Cf. *La Valeur de la Science*, pp. 266-268.

facts. So it is that the mind devises hypotheses. Now, these hypotheses are indeed to some extent artificial, since they claim, not to express the truth, but rather to look for it; they are also provisory since they are not intended to formulate any results but rather to realize some attempts. They are not, however, arbitrary or free; they are suggested at their starting point, regulated and directed in the course of their progressive determinations verified at the end by experiment, by the fact itself. The formula of the scientist is more precise than that of the ignorant; it expresses the same fact.

We are told that the expression of the fact, the scientific or theoretical fact is relative to the instrument used; that according to the perfection of the clock or of the thermometer used, the time of a given instant may be recorded as 9, 8.59 or 9.01,—the temperature of a body as 20° or 19.99° or 20.01° , three theoretical facts representing one and the same practical fact. This is partly true; in reality, however, it means simply that the precision of our knowledge of the fact, in this case is not absolutely but only approximately adequate; that our common fact may be represented not by three divers theoretical facts equally exact but with three divers degrees of approximative precision. Again, we are told that the scientist has selected the instrument which he uses in his observation and measurement; that his observation therefore, and measurement are relative to the kind of instrument used; that, moreover, as these instruments have been constructed according to a certain principle and theories previously accepted, their indications will not have any sense or value except from the point of view of these principles and theories. I answer that, in a general way, these remarks are true. The scientist in the observation and study of facts can and must select his instruments; but this selection is not arbitrary; it is rather strictly determined; it is imposed by the nature of the fact observed, by the aspect or special property examined in it, by the degree of precision which the scientist wishes to reach;¹⁴ briefly, the use of such or such an

¹⁴ Let us not conclude that the knowledge acquired then is measured by our wish; our wish may determine its degree; it does not influence its nature. See farther what we say about the part of the practical element in our knowledge.

instrument is determined by and in relation to the fact observed; its perfection is measured by its adaptation to this fact; and the data which result from its use or scientific fact, reproduce the crude and objective fact with more precision according to the degree of delicacy of the instrument. It is true that the instruments are constructed according to certain theories previously accepted; our instruments are, as it were, the material and mechanical realization of a theory. Let us remark, however, as we shall say later on, that these theories have not been arbitrarily invented by our own mind but are imposed upon us by experience and reflexion; at first we construct our instruments according to the general principles of reason, the primitive data of experience or common sense about the fact to be observed, and the hypotheses suggested by these data and principles. These hypotheses are at the beginning very simple. According to the results obtained, these hypotheses and instruments, controlled by objective experiments, are either corrected or made more and more precise; but every step in the progressive development of the hypotheses and in the precision of our instruments is directed and verified by objective experiments. Our actual instruments with their complex structure and wonderful precision are the result of these successive improvements, the mechanical realization of the knowledge acquired and developed through the collective and successive reflexion of scientists under the suggestion, direction and control of experience.

Briefly, scientific fact is the same as the crude fact, but more clearly and more distinctly known and therefore expressed in more precise language. In scientific observation our mind does not create anything in the result obtained; it perceives or conceives more clearly than common sense the objective reality. Its inventive, or in the larger sense of the word, its creative activity is exercised about and limited to the means necessary to reach this end; it is for this purpose that it devises hypotheses, methods, experiments and instruments; and even in these devises our mind is not free but always in greater or lesser measure, determined at its starting point, guided in its successive steps and controlled in its results by the very fact under observation; its operation consists essentially in its adap-

tation to the objective fact. Hence scientific facts have not a merely subjective or symbolical, but a truly objective value; they are truly representative of reality. Their value as representation, we admit, is relative, not indeed in the subjectivistic sense that it depends fundamentally upon the constitution or attitude of our mind and is ultimately measured by it, but in the objective sense, that although it represents truly the fact as it is in reality, yet its representation is more or less adequate or approximate;¹⁵ our scientific facts are more or less precise and their precision is subject to perfection and progress, this progress having its directive principle, its limit and its criterion in objective reality itself.

And now what is the place of the practical element in the scientific fact? Is it true to say that the scientific fact is an interpretation of the common fact required by our needs or its practical use in our life; that scientific facts are means of action rather than objects of knowledge?

(To be continued.)

GEORGE M. SAUVAGE, C. S. C.

HOLY CROSS COLLEGE.

BROOKLAND, D. C.

¹⁵ There are few words that are as ambiguously used in Philosophy as the words "relativity," "relative," "relativism." We shall see their exact meaning later on when we shall expose the traditional theory of knowledge. Let it suffice here to distinguish briefly between subjective and objective relativity. In the first case our knowledge is said to be relative in the sense that it represents things not according to their real and objective character but according to the constitution of our mind. The objects are known as they appear not as they are in themselves; our knowledge is essentially and primarily relative to the kind of mind that knows; it is true only as phenomenal or appearance; this is Kant's position, a position, which, as we shall see, is ruinous to certitude and true knowledge. In the latter case, our knowledge is said to be relative in the sense that, although representing things in their real and objective characters, it represents them, however, only as far as the power of the knowing mind is able to apprehend them, *i. e.*, in a more or less adequate measure. Things then are known and appear to us as they are, but this knowledge is more or less adequate to the object according to the degree of perfection of the knower, although it is always truly representative of the object in the measure in which the knower knows. Such is the Scholastic doctrine expressed in the axiom: "*Cognitum est in cognoscente ad modum cognoscentis.*" It is in this latter sense that we speak here of the relativity of knowledge.

SOCIOLOGICAL ASPECTS OF LYING.

III.

The most important element in one's character is one's virtue; the relation between the conduct of life and its law. The most important feature in one's virtues is one's attitude toward them. If one invest virtues with a dignity which may not be surrendered and with an authority which is recognized without reluctance and respected without question, then one is lifted into a plane of moral harmony and power. Life receives spirit, discipline and direction from its virtue and is thereby in right relation with its law. If on the contrary, one trim or adapt one's ideas of the virtues in a way to suit one's preferences, exclusions and temperament, such mutilation leads to an entirely false concept of the virtues and thereby life suffers moral disorganization which is fatal to character. Struggle between the two points of view is as old as the race. Virtue seeks to organize and control life while life seeks to define and subject virtue. The heart of man is wayward. It would know only its own restraint and not that of a far away ideal.

Conflict often turns on definitions rather than on principles. Men will agree on a principle of honesty or chastity or truth while they go asunder on definitions of what is honest or chaste or true. When the undisciplined heart can not beat down definitions into relaxed indefiniteness it will endeavor to argue its way. It will claim that the virtue as presented in the Christian idea of moral government of life, is impossible, or if not precisely impossible, that general violation of it is inevitable. On this assumption, neglect in particular cases is to be, it is claimed, indulgently overlooked. The wrong is "natural" or "amiable" or "harmless" and we are to "be easy on the offender." Or again, this subtle human heart will display in all the charm of literary form or with the pointedness of graceful mockery, the awkward extremes to which ob-

servance of virtue may lead when virtue is tactlessly followed and misunderstood. Whatever the method, the aim is none other than to enable the wayward heart to win its victory over the traditional forms of virtue which stand for discipline and moral direction of life.

Possibly no other virtue has suffered more from this process than truthfulness; rather truth. We meet on all sides the assumption that it is an impossible virtue: that it is largely an undesirable member of the family of virtues. Many surrender to the supposed inevitable need of lying when certain situations arise. Efforts to be truthful are made the basis of diverting comedy. Opportune lies are described in literature that lacks neither dignity nor power, as entering into the spectrum thrown by many a splendid virtue on the screen of life. Insidious distinctions abound whereby men may escape service of truth without apparent surrender to falsehood. Good natured persons condone readily forms of untruth which have no excuse but weakness and no cause but moral apathy toward their social consequences. It is unfortunate that Crawford could say, "Sin is easy, only because it meets such very general encouragement," and equally unfortunate that virtue is difficult because it meets so much discouragement. It will be a sad day in the history of morals when men build their virtues to suit their weakness and not their strength: when for instance the truthful man is not alone he who is truthful to the limit of his power but as well he who is untruthful to the degree that his surroundings invite. Virtue is a discipline of human nature and not a concession to it. Truth has suffered because social opinion has often failed to insist on it and as often failed to punish them that lie. One's duty to virtue is not done, as Goldsmith says, when one has praised it. Nor is it done when one has practiced it. One owes to virtue the duty of praising it, of encouraging and expecting it and of resenting its violation because the relation of public or social opinion to a virtue is fundamental. The commonplace practice and feeling of the public toward truth are such that it requires *real* courage to meet the ordinary requirements of the virtue: when not that, at least the tact of a trained diplomat.

Practically all good men are agreed that selfish, cowardly, malicious and boastful lying is without excuse. On the whole it meets the social condemnation that one may reasonably ask. But not all are so clear in view or exact in doctrine when there is question of unselfish, humane, defensive or helpful lying. It borrows specious approval from its goodness of motive, and conscience is made immune against regret by the sight of the good that is done and the evil that would result if truth were told. It is greatly to be regretted that apology for this kind of lying is made in the name of certain very attractive virtues, and conversely that excuse for not telling the truth is made because of a supposed relation between indiscriminate truthfulness and certain mean traits of character. Many resort to the lie in order to be kind. Many do not hesitate to lie when charity seems to invite it. Artaban in *The Other Wise Man*, tells a lie to save a life, and the lie appears as an act of moral heroism. Sociability and culture, loyalty, love of peace, sympathy, prudence, justice, fortitude are too often invoked to excuse some kind of lie. One who will read Mark Twain's *Heaven or Hell* will find described with real power the whole process of mind and emotion by which the lie is drawn into service of the gentler spirit of humanity. Yet one who is true to better understanding of things and who mentally grasps the meaning and function of virtues in individual and race life, will not be convinced that surrender to the lie is a happy solution even when hearts are sodden with grieving tears and appalled by impending death. There are times when one ought to be strong but there are none when one ought to be weak. In such circumstances as those pictured by Twain, the lie takes on the very livery of virtue, and bears itself with even a more conscious grace. That, however, is no solution of the essential difficulty in question. Addison says that what religion calls temptation, the world calls an opportunity. So when lies are told from a gentle motive, to spare pain or defend virtue, the approach to them loses all form of temptation. The sense of wrong is dulled and nothing is seen except an opportunity to be kind or loyal or helpful. And yet, must we not go back to the sterner view? Does not every

high consideration demand that we think as for instance Maturin in his *Laws of Spiritual Life*, when he says, "You know that insincerity is a very odious thing, that an insincere person is one who never can be trusted and ought never under any circumstances to be encouraged. And yet with this knowledge clear before your mind you spend a delightful half-hour talking to a person who scarcely takes the trouble to conceal his insincerity, saying things to please you which you know are not true and which neither he nor you believe. And thinking it over you have to convince yourself again that all this charming unreality is really as much a sin against truth as a vulgar lie told you by a beggar in the street."

This sacrifice of truth in the name of another virtue shows that men fail to understand the virtues and their relations, for no virtue can exist at the cost of violating another. Now the coördination of the virtues in every day life is a supremely difficult task. It requires tact and foresight, self-control and a fine sense of situation, much courage and equal patience. This, however, is the price that must be paid for the triumph of ideals in life. No one gifted with any power of judgment will declare that the task is easy. It is not easy. But in morals the note of difficulty is not a decree of abrogation. They who learn their definitions of virtues without understanding the relations among them may do more harm than service to morality. Chesterton says in *Orthodoxy*, "The vices are indeed let loose and they wander and do damage. But the virtues are let loose also and the virtues wander widely and do terrible damage. The modern world is full of the old Christian virtues gone mad. The virtues have gone mad because they have been isolated from each other and are wandering alone." Isolate truth from kindness and loyalty and patience and it becomes terrible in the hands of jealousy, sarcasm, hate and resentment. Isolate charity, loyalty and sympathy from truth and these become the very pity of life. In this reconciliation of the virtues lies their technique, which is as difficult and more important than that of art or music. Avoidance of standards that are too exacting or too little so, and the meeting of the complex situations of life

as one normally living and working should meet them, make up the triumph of moral self government. In thus doing duty many problems will be met. Whether as regards truth they are best solved by what is called legitimate reservation or by modified definitions or by reference for a standard of truth to a virtue beyond itself, is a serious question which falls properly to the moralist. In view of the acute sensibilities of people it may be well to imitate the example of an eminent President of a great American university who on the occasion of a public address on truth frankly avoided consideration of "the unselfish considerations there may be which in extreme instances justify a man in departing from verbal truthfulness."

II.

Lying is a social phenomenon. Its processes occur in given situations with as much uniformity as the upbuilding of social groups. Not until we recognize social processes as they appear in certain types of lie, shall we be in position to master the problem. Given a tribe or people notorious for lying as Spencer found some Indian tribes, as Renan found the Orientals, as Lyall found primitive peoples generally, as Sumner found the Samoans, this trait will undoubtedly be related to the whole social history of the people in question. And their reformation will be conditioned to a great extent by social conditions and processes as well as by the high moral teaching that would be required to establish right ideals among them. As civilization advances and institutions multiply; as relations among men become more complex and men must trust one another and depend on one another, high sanction for truth telling becomes necessary. It would not be safe nor would it be Christian to leave truth to the mercy of mechanical social processes alone. It must be idealized, revered, fought for, and honestly sanctioned in public opinion. They who continually remind us that it is difficult or impossible are no friends of the social ideal that demands it. They who advise concessions to the complexities of life and carelessly advocate

the lie when it will do "most good," are really delaying moral progress. However, social obstacles to the progress of truth ought to receive attention. One in particular is the social pressure which is toward lying and against truth. Given a general demand for certain types of lie and resentment against certain forms of truth, the lie will be told and the truth avoided by a large number of persons. This social pressure reaches one who utters a lie through him to whom it is told. The beginning and the end of the lie are often in the hearer as one of the public and consequently the moral problem has an important sociological aspect. If careful statements are not respected; if accuracy is futile; if society discounts statements according to its promiscuous assumptions; if words take on meanings from situations which a speaker can not control; if truth often misleads and the lie some times conveys a true impression, it can scarcely be denied that the interests of truth require study that carries us far beyond the speaker.

Lecky in his *History of European Morals* offers this principle, "In the ordinary intercourse of life, it is readily understood that a man is offending against truth not only when he utters a deliberate falsehood but also when in his statement of a case he suppresses or endeavors to conceal essential facts, or makes positive assertions without having verified their grounds." The general application of this rule "in the ordinary intercourse of life" would tend to destroy one's confidence in one's statements and would leave us in a frame of mind like that produced by Whately's "*Historic Doubts*" concerning the existence of Napoleon. It is well established in scholarly circles as far as science is concerned, but under that onesided form it would scarcely serve for every day use. The aim held in mind would be better secured were that principle supplemented by another to the effect that the hearer be as fair and truth loving as the speaker. It should be said, for instance, that he is an enemy of the truth who refuses to believe it, as well as he who conceals it or lies. When one party man is objective and fair, his opponent will not conceal essential facts. But teaching is incomplete and duty is misunderstood when only half the situation is covered by a principle. Lecky's principle is a good

half truth. It should be completed by stating the duty of a hearer to believe, to respect, to be governed by truth when it is told. When authoritative statements are respected, they will be made. When homage is refused to the truth, little effort will be made to state it. Surely our duty toward it is not done unless we accept and respect it when offered.

Accuracy of statement is closely related to truth-telling. The act of communication reduces itself to a question of words and their correct use. We may take for an instance the rule of George Fox, the Quaker, who was "against all language that departed from verbal truthfulness." His law was: "Speak the truth whether merchant or tradesman and all sorts of men whatsoever in all your occasions and in all tradings, dealings and doings. Speak the truth, act the truth and walk in the truth. This brings righteousness forth." Against verbal accuracy, one may allege that that it does not insure in the hearer correct understanding. Scholasticism and logic show us what painstaking care is necessary in order to make exact statements. Even when the statement is exact to the mind of the speaker, no assurance is had that it is understood in just the same manner by the mind of the hearer. An analogous situation is found in the construction of the piano. Were every key tuned accurately, the piano as a whole would be out of tune. Tuning consists in distributing a certain degree of inaccuracy over the key board. One key must represent two different tones, but it can do it only by being true to neither. Mere accuracy of words then is no guarantee of truth. Hence it is that one must keep in mind the impression to be made on the hearer. Not expression so much as impression should guide one in communication.

It is probable that a language will not be more truthful than the soul of those who speak it. Life makes language. The currents of feeling that daily experiences provoke or modify do not flow on without leaving their imprint on the word shores through which they pass. A man's vocabulary is a tolerable picture of his social experience. Words are symbols. We find many meanings forced into one word and we find a word having many synonyms. Words are incomplete. They are

really parts of sentences, the sentence or judgment being the unit. The range of human feeling and emotion is much wider than that of language. "No language is so copious," says Madison in the *Federalist*, "as to supply words and phrases for every complex idea, or so correct as not to include many, equivocally denoting different ideas." The difficulty of expressing exactly what is intended is illustrated in a warranty deed, for instance, by which an owner of land does "grant, bargain, sell, and convey" it to the buyer.

Passing on from what may be called the objective inaccuracies of language, we may consider the subjective variations to be found in the word values of individuals. Back of the uses of a word in the individual's vocabulary, is the whole process of his mind with a hundred determining circumstances. A Belgian peasant, an American hunter and an Indian chief unanimously call a certain dog, good. They agree in the word but the Belgian thinks of hauling, the American, of hunting, and the Indian, of eating. These particular word values are brought out by the following from Tiedeman, *Unwritten Constitution of the United States*. "A word used by one man does not necessarily have the same shade of meaning which it might have when used by another. But every word must be understood rightly to have a certain and common meaning else it would be impossible for one mind to communicate with another. But within the limits of the general meaning of a word, there may be and usually are various shades of meaning which the word alone can not unfold and which must be learned from other sources."

But beyond the objective and subjective looseness or variations in the use of words, there is the confusion of divided being in us that half hinders us from really knowing what we feel or think. The difficulty which is met in every day life is thus stated by George Eliot in *Adam Bede*. "Examine your words well and you will find that even when you have no motive to be false, it is a very hard thing to say the exact truth, even about your own immediate feelings, much harder than to say something fine about them which is not the exact truth."

This division of self appears between one's mechanical feel-

ings and one's intentions or wishes: between one's natural self and one's culture self. All men are conscious of it and are often confused, not knowing which "I" speaks on a given occasion. Henry James in describing such a dilemma of one of his characters says: "The words were the mere hypocrisy of her reflective endeavor for virtue." There was merit in the children's story which Coventry Patmore's wife intended to write. It concerned a race of men with tails, the tail wagging automatically to express real feelings, regardless of what one said. Such an organ of candor showing deeper feelings in spite of us would lead to very disturbing complications.

If the duty toward truth rested on the nature of language, it would seem that mastery of language would bring with it the suggestion of veracity which would cause masters to stand out in moral preëminence. Yet the opposite is the case. The most carefully used words are most apt to be misunderstood, for people are notoriously inaccurate in their use of words. It was remarkable that Gladstone was much suspected of insincerity. Scarcely a greater master of English lived in his time. Morley says of him in his biography, "He seemed to be completely satisfied if he could only show that two propositions thought by plain men to be directly contradictory were all the time capable on close construction of being presented in perfect harmony, as if I had a right to look only to what my words literally mean or may in good logic be made to mean, and had no concern at all with what the people meant who used the same words, or with what I might have known that my hearers were all the time supposing me to mean."

Language as the vehicle of expression is a more or less uncertain factor in the process of truth telling. The objective variations in words, the subjective inaccuracy in the uses of words by individuals, make accuracy extremely difficult of realization. And further concern may be felt when one realizes that differences in moral, social and mental standards among men, will lead them even when using words correctly, to apply them to most unlike situations, or to apply contradictory and exclusive terms to the same situation. This may be seen readily in every day experience. A and B observe Mr. Jones refuse

money to a beggar. A is opposed to begging. B favors it. A praises Mr. Jones for wisdom; B condemns him for stinginess. Where is the truth? If B alone observed Mr. Jones and reported to A, each would have a different impression. Again A is the friend, B is the enemy of Mr. Jones. D tells them a series of facts concerning him. A feels friendly emotions stirred and he interprets D in one way. B feels angry emotions and he interprets in an entirely different way. Who understood Mr. Jones accurately? Where is the truth? Children sometimes so construct two paper wheels on one pivot that a breeze striking them fairly sends them revolving in different directions. It is much the same with emotions and minds, meeting given facts but judging them from different points of view. Variations among standards of every kind lead men to place most divergent constructions on the simplest statements.

We find in summing up that the same word is used in many senses: that words understood in the same sense are applied to unlike situations, and that extreme accuracy, in consequence, does not insure correct understanding. All of this bears on the problem of truth. For on the one hand, we have the stern moral law imposing it; on the other, social situations forbidding it and inviting the lie. Many find a way out by taking advantage of these peculiarities of language. They avoid a verbal lie but mislead effectively or evade the truth with success. Were language a fixed and rigid factor, the whole problem would be different.

Finally as regards an admittedly true statement, it will not necessarily convey the truth, in view of the elements in individual minds and in the social atmosphere. Paradoxical as it may appear, it is none the less true unfortunately that one can convey a true impression by lying and a false impression by telling the truth. It was said of Bismarck that he sometimes told the truth, for purposes of deception, to those who expected him to lie.

Says a writer in the *Atlantic Monthly*, "I have come to realize that one must often tell a lie in order to convey a true impression since the matter of a lie as of a jest,

"Lies in the ear
Of him who hears it, never in the mouth
Of him who speaks it."

La Rochefoucauld gives us the maxim, "Some disguised falsehoods represent the truth so well, that it would be bad judgment not to be deceived by them." In a similar view Le Galliene says, "There is no duty we owe to truth more imperative than that of lying stoutly on occasion, for indeed there is often no other way of conveying the whole truth than by telling the part lie." Cynical as this is, we find the same thought expressed with almost tragic earnestness by Morley, who in explaining away Burke's "minor overstatements of the case" against Hastings, says: "It is one of the inscrutable perplexities of human affairs that in the logic of practical life, in order to reach conclusions that cover enough for the truth, we are constantly driven to premises that cover too much." It is equally regrettable to find that the truth serves for purposes of deception.

We read in a recent novel, "I at once decided to deceive her utterly and therefore I spoke the exact truth." The speaker referred to his act as one of "mendacious veracity." Lytton tells us in *Alice* that Vargrave "found a familiar frankness, a more useful species of simulation." A recent campaign book was quoted as saying of an eminent American, "Even when he tells the truth, he does so in order to disguise an evil purpose." Hawthorne represents Mr. Dimmesdale in *The Scarlet Letter*, as telling the truth in a general way to his audience, conscious at the time that they would be misled. "He had spoken the very truth and transformed it into the veriest falsehood." Not to carry the evidence too far, we find in Robert Louis Stevenson this stern and true word: "A lie may be told by a truth or a truth conveyed through a lie. Truth to fact is not always truth to sentiment, and part of the truth as often happens in answer to a question may be the foulest calumny. A fact may be an exception but the feeling is the law and it is that you must neither garble or belie."

III.

The security and the harmony of social relations are conditioned on a delicate and fixed sense of respect and frank veneration for truth. This natural need of truth is the basis of a positive and formal Christian teaching on the moral duty of truth. The domination of this virtue in social intercourse will depend to a great extent on social processes as they favor or hinder the development of the practice of the truth. We find in fact a marked social pressure easily described and universally experienced which is an obstacle. The temperament of our race is such that we resent truth of certain kinds even when it is called for, and we invite untruth as often. Culture has accepted guidance from these conditions and it is inclined to deal leniently with infractions of the law of truth. Mahaffy in his *Art of Conversation*, for instance, goes so far as to say, "Even a consummate liar, though generally vulgar, and therefore offensive, is a better ingredient in a company than the scrupulously truthful man who weighs every statement, questions every fact and corrects every inaccuracy. In the presence of such a social scourge, I have heard a witty talker pronounce it the golden rule of conversation to know nothing accurately." In the presence of a moral law forbidding the lie and social processes and relations pressing toward it and away from truth, it is to be expected that advantage will be taken of every resource in order not to violate the moral law by lying and not to sacrifice self-interest or offend others by the truth. In this situation resort will be taken to inaccuracies in use of words, to partial statements, to different standards of judgment, to misleading truths and other devices. The sum of all these methods shows the moral tragedy of the situation. A few will meet the situation where hundreds of others will lie, while they who invite the lie will never feel its guilt. The race has learned to love truth and venerate it, yet it carries in its own practices and traits, elements of defeat. When we hear that the virtue of truth makes impossible demands: when we hear that the truth-teller is a crank: when we are told that lying is

necessary, we obtain evidence of surrender to situations rather than of loyalty to an ideal. When we meet good natured toleration of customary lies we are in presence of those who have not found it worth while to work and hope and battle for the supremacy of an ideal. When we are advised as is done in Mahaffy's little treatise not to allow extreme truthfulness to tyrannize over us, we find the tactless extreme of a virtue mistaken for its normal and healthy form. Whatsoever way we turn, we can not escape certain sociological facts, to call attention to which ought to be of service to truth. Lies are broadly of two kinds: those told by the unhampered choice of the liar, and those told in response to definite social pressure from outside. These latter lies are usually defensive of the speaker's interests or are intended to be a service to others. They are thoughtful, kind, helpful. The processes back of the two kinds are as unlike as can be imagined; their meaning in the morals of the race is not at all identical.

Confining attention to the second class, it may be said that the indiscretions of those in authority cause subjects to lie: sensitiveness in all classes forces many to lie. Resentment against unpleasant truth, hunger for pleasant sayings, whether true or false: partisanship which sacrifices truth to interest; too open reluctance to believe men when they take the trouble to speak the truth; curiosity and impudence are other effective forms of social pressure acting on the individual and hindering the advance of truth in society. We may not hope to revolutionize the psychology of the race to such a degree that these traits will disappear. But, we should take account of them in working for the interests of truth. If we might generally be brought to realize that we too as well as the liar are responsible for many of the lies told to us, and if then our influence on others were made a matter of conscientious watchfulness, until no one could find the faintest excuse for lying to us, great things could be accomplished.

We must believe in the possibility of practical victory for truth. No array of discouraging facts, no flippancy of literature, no pessimism of the cynic and no apathy of weaklings should rob us of our devotion to its ideal. One comedy

tells us that fifty per cent. of women have no sense of truth and that it is only rudimentary in the remainder. A learned novel of late date contains the statement, "men lie so constantly that I know when they do not—by contrast." Another tells us that "men employ truth and falsehood for much the same reasons." A novel once widely read claims that the faculty of lying was given to man by nature as a means of self-defense. Hazlitt in one of his essays claims that "Lying is a species of wit and humor." These observations are of course not encouraging. Many have been unable to think out happy solutions for the complex problems that truth presents. They are undoubtedly influenced towards laxity by reading such views. But we must believe in truth and believe that when we understand it, it is practicable. If social analysis which is now throwing so much light on every kind of social process, will but make clear that lying is itself part of a social process, and if then our moral and academic teachers take advantage of that knowledge, there is no reason why most of the difficulties of truth telling should not be overcome, in as far at least as lying is a response to social pressure.

WILLIAM J. KERBY.

THE UNIVERSITY OF LOUVAIN (1834-1909).

During the second week in May, the Catholic University of Louvain celebrated with becoming solemnity the seventy-fifth anniversary of its restoration. The occasion brought together a large number of distinguished men including representatives of the Episcopate, the Academies and the Universities. Their presence was a notable tribute to the energy and zeal which in less than a century has placed Louvain among the foremost universities of the world, while proof was thus given of the cordial relations which normally exist among those who are devoted to the real interests of truth.

It was but natural that the key-note of the various discourses contained in the program should be the steady development of the University and the work which it has accomplished in all departments of knowledge. In fact one cannot but marvel at the results when one considers the situation which confronted the pioneers in the movement of reorganization. The political changes which marked the close of the eighteenth century had crippled the University in every way. Under foreign domination, Louvain had passed through one conflict only to enter upon another. Finally, by an ordinance of October 25, 1797, the University was abolished, the professors dispersed and all sources of revenue confiscated or turned over to other public utilities. The institution founded by Pope Martin V in 1425 had ceased to exist; the revolutionary spirit had swept away one of the chief bulwarks of religion, and Belgium was reduced to a few isolated Faculties which were merged in the system dominated by the University of France.

A generation had passed when the Belgian bishops at their meeting in 1833 undertook with characteristic courage the work of restoration. By his Brief of December 13, 1833, Gregory XVI gave the project his approval and by a special Constitution of April 8, 1834, authorized the conferring of degrees. The new University was established at Malines but was trans-

ferred within a year to Louvain, and once more domiciled in the ancient *Halles*. The teaching staff at the opening of the courses comprised 13 professors; at present there are 101. The registration of students in 1834-35 was 86; it increased to 528 in 1840-41; to 1045 in 1871-72; for the current academic year it is 2075. This steady advance necessitated continual additions to the equipment in the way of libraries, laboratories, museums and institutes for special purposes, so that at the present time excellent facilities for work are provided in every department. Alongside of buildings that date from the mediæval period new structures have arisen in response to the requirements of modern science, while the work of the traditional four faculties has been more and more specialized in various schools. Louvain thus presents in its organization and development the best illustration of the truly Catholic spirit of progress in which *nova et vetera* are happily combined.

So much could hardly have been accomplished without difficulty and struggle. The events of 1848-49 in particular occasioned serious danger to the University and it was only by the exercise of prudence and firmness that the rights and liberties of the institution were preserved. For three-quarters of a century, Louvain has stoutly defended the principle of *enseignement libre*, i. e., of teaching without trammel or hindrance on the part of the State. At the same time, the University has loyally conformed with the regulations enacted by public authority with a view to bettering the work of education. A truly patriotic spirit has shaped its policy and guided its labors; indeed, no greater service could have been rendered to Belgium than this maintenance of liberty in the pursuit of truth.

"Truth," however, for Louvain means the whole truth—not the discovery of facts in a particular department of knowledge, nor the triumph of reason at the expense of faith. What has been proclaimed over and over again about the harmony between science and revelation is here demonstrated in concrete form. It is just because of its steadfast adherence to Catholic belief that the University opens to its professors and students every line of research, well knowing that the final outcome can only set in clearer light the truths that are taught by the Church.

There is no better object lesson in apologetics than the organization and activity of the University of Louvain.

Doubtless, it has cost something to teach the lesson; it has called for vigilance, patience and ceaseless endeavor. Fortunately these qualities have never been wanting in the men to whom the interests of the University were confided. The Belgian Episcopate, from the very outset, realized the necessity of strengthening the University and quickening its growth. Millions of souls were to be cared for; provision had to be made for the support of religion in diocese and parish; seminaries, elementary schools and beneficent institutions of every sort had to be maintained. None of these things have been neglected; but the bishops saw clearly that the very heart of religious life was the University where the priesthood would be trained by the best scientific methods and the laity educated for professional careers by teachers of unswerving faith and unquestioned ability. To the intelligence and the united efforts of its episcopate, Catholic Belgium is chiefly indebted for the blessings of higher education which the University provides.

The task in one respect would have been comparatively simple had the episcopate or the University itself enjoyed vast revenues or received such endowments as yearly go to build up some of our American institutions. But these resources were lacking and from the national exchequer nothing was to be expected. On the other hand, a treasury lay open in the generosity of the people. Once the meaning of the University was brought home to them, and its essential importance for the preservation of Church, society and family made plain, they responded gladly to the appeal of their pastors. Semi-annual collections in each parish along with individual contributions enabled the University not only to meet its current expenses but also to add from time to time such departments as are needed. Louvain is therefore a centre of interest for the Catholic people at large no less than for the priests, physicians and lawyers who proudly claim it as their *Alma Mater*.

The internal administration of the University has been entrusted to men who thoroughly understood its needs, its aims and its possibilities. Their experience as professors and their

scholarly attainments qualified them for the position and enabled them to direct prudently and normally the development of the institution to which they devoted their lives. De Ram (1834-1865) in the midst of his labors for reorganizing the University, found time to bring out a long series of publications on biographical, historical and academic subjects. His example was followed by Laforet (1865-72), Namèche (1872-81), Pieraerts (1881-87) and Abbeloos (1887-98). Each of these Rectors, while busied with research in some special department of science, gave serious attention to the educational problems which concerned the country at large and made Louvain the center of a system including seminaries, colleges and elementary schools. The influence exerted by the University upon these preparatory institutions has been most salutary. It has secured unity of purpose and has maintained educational standards by preparing competent teachers and improving the methods of instruction. Above all, it has developed among the clergy a devotion to "things of the mind," which commands the respect of intelligent people.

The student at Louvain finds abundant inspiration for scientific work in the achievements of the men who in every field of investigation have won distinction and pointed the way of progress. To mention but a few, the University counts among her theologians such scholars as Beelen, Malon, Feije, Jungmann and Lamy; among her professors of law, Delcour, Thonissen and Périn; in philosophy and letters, David, Ubaghs, Nève de Monge, de Harlez, Pouillet, and Alberdingk Thym; in the sciences, Martens, Pagani della Torre, Van Beneden, Gilbert, de la Vallée Poussin, and Carnoy; in medicine, Schwann, Michaux, Hubert, Van Kempen, and Lefebvre. The record left by each of these men is a precious inheritance for the University and a source of pride for Catholics throughout the world.

America owes Louvain a special debt of gratitude. The American College founded in 1857 offers the student from this country the advantages of close affiliation with the University, and it furnishes a steady supply of priests for our dioceses. Among its graduates it counts four archbishops, eleven bishops, and over seven hundred priests, whose zeal and intelligence

have given ample proof of the excellent training they received in Louvain.

In the Bull of foundation in 1425 Martin V speaks of the duty imposed on him as Head of the Church to "scatter the darkness of ignorance and to encourage every sort of science in order that new germs of prosperity may develop among all classes of society." How well the new University of Louvain has performed this duty is readily seen by a glance over its history since 1834. The recent celebration was fully justified by the University's services to all classes of society. It promises much for the future not only of the Church in Belgium but for religion and science in all parts of the world.

The Catholic University of America has found much to imitate in what Louvain has accomplished, and is heartily grateful for the inspiration and encouragement which it has thence received. We gladly add our congratulations to those which have made this seventy-fifth anniversary a real jubilee, and we look forward with deepest interest to the further development at Louvain and the success which is now assumed for all its undertakings.

EDWARD A. PACE.

COLLÈGE DU ST. ESPRIT,
LOUVAIN, BELGIUM.

NOTES ON EDUCATION.

THE TEACHING OF RELIGION.

In the last number of the *Bulletin* it was stated that the chief things to be accomplished for the children during the period of their life preliminary to that in which they are taught to use the First Reader may be summed up under these four heads: 1) To give the children a realization of the school as an enlarged and specialized home; 2) to develop the individual child's power of adjusting himself to his physical environment; 3) to teach the children to coöperate with each other and with their teacher; 4) to enlarge the children's spoken vocabulary and to develop a limited written vocabulary with direct reference to their first reader. The first three of these have already been dealt with; the fourth must now occupy our attention.

IV. LANGUAGE.

In exceptional cases the child of six has learned to read at home, but in the great majority of cases the children have only a spoken vocabulary which is quite limited in range and full of imperfections. Nevertheless, it is with this vocabulary that the children must begin their school work. Moreover, this vocabulary constitutes one more bond between the home and the school and it should not be disturbed until the child has learned to feel quite at home in the school. After a few days the teacher may correct imperfections in pronunciation and mistakes in the use of words, but in this she should proceed with great care. The children must not be humiliated or made self-conscious and above all there must be no implied correction of the home standards or reflection upon the knowledge of the home group. In a word, the negative method should be avoided with scrupulous care for in addition to the usual dangers of this method there

is here imminent danger of injuring fundamental elements in the child's character and of weakening his respect for parental authority. If the teacher uses language correctly herself, and if she insists on the children using it correctly, there will be no need to call the attention of the school to the child's mistakes in pronunciation and in the use of words. These, if left alone, will disappear rapidly.

Where English is the native language of the child the teacher need not concern herself much with the task of increasing his spoken vocabulary. This will grow naturally and without apparent effort on her part. The language work of the first grade should consist chiefly in giving the child control over a written vocabulary that lies well within the limits of his spoken vocabulary. By this we do not mean that the children should be made to memorize a certain number of written words and to drill on their spelling. All this might be accomplished and still leave the child without that control of a written vocabulary of which we are here speaking. The only effectual work in teaching written language to a child is that which connects the written symbols intimately and immediately with the things signified. It will not do to have spoken language intervene. The child must be taught to think in written language from the beginning. The case here is analogous to that presented by an older pupil who is learning a foreign language. It is generally recognized by all who have experimented with the matter that so long as we continue to think in our own language we acquire but scanty facility in the use of a foreign tongue. As long as we have to translate our thoughts before giving them expression our language will be stiff and artificial. Ease comes only when we think in the very symbols that we use in speaking or in writing. This is as true of the relationship between written and spoken language as it is between one's native language and a foreign tongue, and it is as true of the child as it is of the man.

The child's written language should begin with action words, which the teacher should write on the blackboard and illustrate for the children by doing the thing signified. After this, the written word should be used by the teacher as command or permission for the children to perform the action signified. The

names of various familiar objects should be written on the board and the children allowed to handle the objects and exercise their various senses upon them. From simple names and action words the teacher should proceed rapidly to simple action sentences. In this way the child may be taught to think in written symbols from the beginning, which is a matter of the greatest importance, not only for the child's future as an elocutionist but for his future as a student of books.

In this first stage in the child's acquisition of written language the book is a needless impediment. The mere holding of the book distracts the child and hampers his movements. Moreover, the writing of the words on the board in the child's presence is an important factor in the process. It holds his attention and directs it successively to each part of the form of the word, thus making a deeper impression upon the child's brain than could be made where the completed word is looked at as a whole.

After the child is made familiar with a few words and sentences from observation and action he should be taught to write them first on the blackboard and then on paper at his desk. Children at this stage of development learn most things through imitation and it is in this way that they learn to write. They observe the movements of the teacher's hand and arm and the image of these movements in the child's brain tends of itself to reproduce the movement. Moreover, the child deliberately attempts to imitate the movement which he perceives. Some teachers find the practice of writing the words in the air and having all the children follow the movements simultaneously helpful in the initial stages of the work. In stamping the words on the child's visual memory recourse is frequently had to desk work with pegs, colored and uncolored sticks, seeds, the dissected alphabet, etc. Such exercises will prove helpful if they are used in moderation and as supplementary work, but they should not constitute the main reliance of the teacher in the difficult task of teaching the children to take their first steps in the art of writing. After a small working vocabulary in script form has been acquired the children should be taught the

same words and sentences in printed form by means of suitable charts.

In determining the nature of the written vocabulary to be taught the children before they are allowed to read from the book the first book to be placed in the child's hands must serve as our guide. The children should know practically all the words and sentences contained in the first few pages of the reader before they are allowed to use the book and it would be well if a large percentage of the vocabulary used in the subsequent lessons were mastered in the same way before the children were allowed to read the stories.

In the preparation of Religion, First Book, great care was exercised in the vocabulary used. In the first stories there will be found a large percentage of action words and the other words are taken from the most familiar portions of the child's mental content. The names of the pictures and stories are not considered in this class, and they may be passed over if found too difficult, but all who are familiar with children are aware of the ease with which they learn even difficult names when attached to a picture or an object.

During the first few months in which the child uses a reading book the teacher should prepare for each lesson by suitable blackboard and chart work so as to preserve for the child the joy of the completed story in its association with the book. This practice is particularly important when Religion, First Book, is in question.

It will be observed that each part of this book begins with a nature study which offers suitable material for action work and dramatic games. These nature stories foreshadow the home scenes which follow. These may be dramatized in part, but even the child grows weary of too much play and so this second part of the chapter is meant to be acted out in serious home occupations. The child takes an intense delight in real things after he has caught an inkling of their meaning through his games. The nature studies and the home scenes constitute an adequate preparation for the religious stories which form the concluding part of each chapter. These should lead the child to prayer rather than to play. The concluding songs, as will

be seen, are sweet and joyous, but prayerful at the same time. Thus each chapter should be prepared for by appropriate plays and drills. From this the child passes over into the realm of serious social duties and ends, as he should in all his thoughts and aspirations, in communion with God.

The details of the work for the first grade and the methods to be employed are dealt with to some extent in Chapters XIV and XV of *The Teaching of Religion*,¹ and they will be dealt with exhaustively in a manual of primary methods which is now in preparation, here we need add but one word concerning the first grade teacher.

The child's education, in reality, begins with the dawn of his conscious life and it is quite advanced when, in his sixth year, he makes his first momentous journey from home to school to begin there the work of his formal education in a new environment, under the eyes of a number of strange children, in an institution that is wholly unfamiliar and with a teacher who is a stranger to him. It is not probable that the child will ever again be called upon to submit to so sudden and so radical a change in all those things that affect the deeper currents of his life here and that determine his eternal destiny hereafter. So radical, in fact, is this change that we are accustomed to think of the child's first day in school as the beginning of a new mode of life and we habitually speak of it as the date on which his education began. The difficulty and importance attaching to the child's transition from the home to the school are sufficient reasons in themselves for demanding in the first grade teacher the highest degree of pedagogical skill, but in addition to this the teacher must help the child to make a beginning along several new lines of activity. Were one of these to be dealt with at a time the matter would be sufficiently difficult, but when they must all be dealt with at the same time the difficulty is greatly increased.

It must be taken for granted that the teacher to whom this important work is entrusted is prepared, through training and

¹ *The Teaching of Religion*, by T. E. Shields, in twenty separate chapters, multi-graphed, Catholic Correspondence School, Brookland, D. C., \$2.00 net.

experience, to deal with the situation, nevertheless, a concrete sketch of the child's first day in school is presented here not, indeed, that the teacher is expected to follow it literally, but that it may serve the purpose of illustrating the bearing of certain educational principles on the various exercises which engage the attention of the children when they begin the work in school.

The day's work outlined in the program supposes that at least a majority of the children have attended the kindergarten department of the school during the preceding school year. When all the children come directly from home without having had the advantage of kindergarten training, modifications will have to be made. The work of registering pupils and interviewing parents will take longer and will, consequently, delay the principal's introduction. It will also probably be wiser to attempt fewer exercises on the first day when the children are entirely without training along coöperative lines and when the strangeness of their environment is likely to inhibit their tendency to express themselves in any way. Every teacher who has had experience in dealing with the first grade knows that it is difficult if not quite impossible to carry out a rigid program on the opening day of school, nevertheless, a definite program has its value as an ideal.

PROGRAM FOR FIRST DAY.

Morning.

Principal's Introduction,	-	-	-	-	-	9- 9.20
Greeting Game,	-	-	-	-	-	9.20- 9.40
Assignment of Places,	-	-	-	-	-	9.40- 9.55
Action Game,	-	-	-	-	-	9.55-10
Story,	-	-	-	-	-	10-10.15
Recess, out-doors,	-	-	-	-	-	10.15-10.30
Sleeping Game and surprise,	-	-	-	-	-	10.30-10.40
Seat Work,	-	-	-	-	-	10.40-10.55
Concert recitation,	-	-	-	-	-	10.55-11.15
Good Bye Song,	-	-	-	-	-	11.15-11.20
Prayer,	-	-	-	-	-	11.20-11.25
Dismissal,	-	-	-	-	-	11.25-11.30

Afternoon.

Individual welcome,	-	-	-	-	-	-	1.15-1.25
Finding seats,	-	-	-	-	-	-	1.25-1.30
Prayer,	-	-	-	-	-	-	1.30-1.35
Talk by Teacher,	-	-	-	-	-	-	1.35-1.45
Finger Song,	-	-	-	-	-	-	1.45-1.50
Music lesson,	-	-	-	-	-	-	1.50-2.05
Action Game,	-	-	-	-	-	-	2.05-2.10
Seat work,	-	-	-	-	-	-	2.10-2.30
Recess, out-doors,	-	-	-	-	-	-	2.30-2.45
Sleeping Game,	-	-	-	-	-	-	2.45-2.50
Sense training,	-	-	-	-	-	-	2.50-3.05
Seat Work,	-	-	-	-	-	-	3.05-3.20
Good Night Song,	-	-	-	-	-	-	3.20-3.25
Prayer,	-	-	-	-	-	-	3.25-3.30
Dismissal,	-	-	-	-	-	-	3.30

As has already been said, one of the chief benefits of the kindergarten is the help which it affords the child in the difficult task of bridging over the chasm between the home and the school. This end is best attained when the kindergarten is conducted as a department of the primary school, in which case it must be coördinated with the work of the first grade. In this way the children become familiar with the school and they learn to look upon the principal as the embodiment of authority. During the last months of their sojourn in the kindergarten their attention is constantly turned towards the first grade room and their ambition to enter it is aroused in every way possible. They are also visited from time to time by the teacher of the first primary grade, who in this way learns what the children can do best, what songs they like best to sing, what games they take chief delight in, etc. The primary teacher will take advantage of all this to get the children started in the work of the first grade without unnecessary strain.

The children should be led gradually to realize that teachers are not obeying their own caprices but a higher authority which for them is vested in the principal, and hence it is well that the principal bring the children from the kindergarten to the first grade room and formally hand them over to the care of their new teacher who is to guide them in their new field of work.

In the meanwhile the primary teacher should prepare the class of the preceding year to accompany the principal to the next higher grade room. As the principal with the kindergartners following her enters the room, the former primary grade pupils relinquish their seats to the new-comers and stand aside while they listen to the principal's talk and wait for her to accompany them to the next room. It is scarcely necessary to say that the principal's talk to the little children should be spontaneous and that it should be drawn from the local circumstances and from her acquaintance with their work in the kindergarten, but whatever the form, at least the following three points should be embodied in it: 1) The high standard which the first grade room has always maintained and an appeal to the children for their best efforts to uphold this standard during the present year; 2) the teacher is the principal's representative and the principal looks forward to hearing as pleasant things of the conduct and application of the children during this year as she has heard of them in the past from the kindergarten teacher; 3) the work of the primary grade is the foundation of the work in all the grades and it must be well done for the sake of the entire school.

The few simple words of the principal's introduction, if well chosen, will help to make the children realize their growing participation in the social activity of this, to them, new institution, the school. It should help to develop the social side of the child's nature and to bring him to yield a rational obedience to authority as vested in his superiors.

When the kindergarten is not coördinated with the work of the first grade it not infrequently unfits the children for the more severe drills of this grade. Such a kindergarten has very little to commend it. It is better to have no training than to have training in the wrong direction. Where the children about to enter the first grade have not had a kindergarten training the principal's talk will be somewhat more difficult, but it should contain precisely the same points.

After the principal leaves the room taking with her the children who are promoted to the next room, the teacher should take hold of the class without hesitation or delay and deal with

them as one having authority. Delay is dangerous; too much talking on the part of the teacher is bad at all times but in this situation it is demoralizing; action is the thing needed; it is the one thing that the children understand and they should be kept busy and active until their interest can be aroused and correct habits of work formed. They must not be given time to sit still and study the teacher until they have grown to know her and to respond naturally to her directions. A greeting game well planned and well carried out is an excellent way in which to deal with the situation. The children should be told that their parents and friends as well as strangers are going to visit them from time to time and that they must all know how to receive them and greet them properly. One of the children is selected to play visitor and is told to go out of the room and knock at the door. When she does so, the teacher opens the door and greets her as Mrs. ———. Bringing her to the front of the room she presents her to the class, whereupon all the children rise and return her salutation. This process is repeated, several different children playing visitor, and the class is instructed, to rise, to bow, and to salute simultaneously. In this salute soft, low, sweet voices are held up as the ideal. In this way the children's interest may be maintained while they are being taught in a practical way the beauty of good manners and the value of concert work. The exercise might well conclude with a good morning song.

The third exercise on the program is the assignment of places. The children should be made to feel at home in the school, and an important step towards the accomplishment of this end is taken when we assign to each child a desk and a seat that are to be his own during his sojourn in the room. The property instinct is here appealed to and the child's individuality is allowed to assert itself. He should be gradually made to feel the responsibility for these school possessions; this will nourish the roots of many social virtues such as honesty, order, neatness, etc. The analogy between the rows of desks and the aisles separating them to houses and streets is not without value. The children may easily be led to give the name of the street on which they live and the number of their house. This leads the

children to talk to the teacher and forms a sort of personal introduction between her and the children's homes. If the desks be numbered and the aisles named, the children will readily enter into the spirit of the game and for some time at least they will delight in thinking of their new homes with their new numbers and new street names. In this simple exercise there is foreshadowed for the children the community life of a city and the responsibility of each householder towards the city at large for the condition of his premises.

To be ceaselessly active during his waking hours is the normal condition of the child six years old. Every sensation and every perception tends to pass over into action without delay. In school he must learn to think, but this is a slow process which in the beginning is so closely linked with action that thought without action is difficult and fatiguing. In the early stages of the process he must be given frequent rest which he will find most naturally in the free play of his muscles, hence the action games which constitute the next exercise on the program. It should be borne in mind that the children in this stage of their development learn almost exclusively through imitation and that their whole being responds readily and joyously to the call for rhythmic motion. These considerations should determine the character of the action games to be employed. The children should be taught to stand in the aisles beside their desks erect and alert. One row at a time should be asked to follow the teacher's lead in playing the games. After the children have been told what to do the teacher should run around the room imitating the movements of a bird's wings with her arms while singing some simple bird song in three-four time, such as *The Brown Birds are Flying*. The children should imitate the movements of the teacher without attempting to join in the song. The teacher might next sing a running song in two-four time, such as the squirrel song, acting the part of the leader as before. Finally, the teacher might sing a song in four-four time, such as *The Soldier Boy*, while she marches around the room with the children following her. Before each of these exercises the teacher should stimulate the imaginations of the children by brief appropriate stories followed by the suggestion that they play "bird,"

or "squirrel," or "soldier," as the case may be. Of course the teacher takes the part of the mother bird, the mother squirrel and the captain. As these games are repeated on successive days they should be gradually developed; new details should be added each day and new situations occasionally suggested. New games should be added at frequent intervals both for the sake of keeping the children interested and because of the important rôle which these action games play in building up the children's oral and written vocabularies.

The interval between the action games and recess might be profitably filled out with a short story about birds, such as that of the morning glory and the robin. The little morning glory that lives by the lilac bush is consumed with curiosity to see what the robins, who are building a nest in the bush so far above her head, are doing. A good little girl comes to the rescue by giving the morning glory a string by which she climbs up to the top of the fence and finally reaches a position on the lilac bush where she can look into the robin's nest that is now the home of four little robins. If this interval and an occasional talk, which should take the place on the program of the principal's introduction, be used to good advantage, the children's imaginations will be prepared for the nature study work that forms so important a part in preparing the children for the reception of the religious truths presented in Religion, First Book.

When the children reassemble after the out-door recess they are likely to be full of excitement. They should be quieted down before their attention is turned to school exercises. This may readily be accomplished through a sleeping game. The children are led to imagine that they are birds going to sleep with their heads under their wings. They should be told that they are not to wake up until the cuckoo calls them and that while they are asleep a fairy will bring something to each one of them. The teacher sings a lullaby while she places a tray of colored pegs on each desk and then wakes the children with a cuckoo call. This exercise of the imagination will usually be found effective in emptying the children's minds of the distracting thoughts engendered by the recess. It will also call up pleasurable feel-

ing in the children which is the proper solvent for the assimilation of their mental food. The seat work which follows this exercise presents many problems for solution the importance of which is altogether out of proportion with the space at our disposal in these pages. They will be discussed at length in a manual of method for primary grades which is now in preparation. Here it suffices to say that the work of the kindergarten must be taken as the starting point and the children must be led towards independence in their actions. In the kindergarten the teacher works with the children whenever exercises in outlining are attempted. In the first grade she puts on the board the simplest outline of a house telling the children that it is a picture of their home. Each child will see in it the picture of his own house, which he should proceed to outline on his desk, making use of the colored pegs, etc. During the exercise the teacher should pass from desk to desk giving encouragement to all the children and help to all those who need it. Great care must be taken, however, not to give unnecessary help. This exercise, as will be seen at once, constitutes a transition between the outlining as it is usually conducted in the kindergarten and the reproduction of forms from models which should characterize the work of the first grade. Secondly, the exercise contains an appeal to the child's constructive instinct. Thirdly, the coördination of hand and eye is developed to some extent and a preparation is made for the later work in drawing and writing. There is obviously less difficulty in outlining a letter or a form with pegs than there is in making it with a crayon. Corrections in the form are also more readily made in this way. Moreover, the cramped position of the fingers which usually results from the child's first strained efforts to write is here avoided while the form is being developed in his imagination and memory. After this has been accomplished learning to write or to draw is comparatively easy.

The selection of a house as the subject of the outlining work has a value of its own. It carries the child's thoughts back to his home and brings to him some of the ease generated by the home atmosphere in which he lives in imagination while doing the work. Moreover, his memory clothes the meagre outline

on the blackboard with color and definiteness which in themselves are no small factors in the successful issue of the work. Finally, in this exercise the children in doing their work take a decided step towards independence of the teacher and this is one of the most important and most difficult phases of primary work.

After fifteen minutes of this desk work the children are in need of a rest, which they will find in the concert recitation. Some rhyme that the children have learned in the kindergarten or at home, such as *Two Little Blackbirds*, or any of the *Mother Goose* rhymes, will answer. After a few minutes' training in concert recitation the children should be taught to dramatize the rhyme. This dramatization develops the children's power of coöperation and it plays an important rôle in unfolding to the children during the early stages of their school work the meaning of language, particularly of written language. In addition to this the dramatization develops grace of movement and calls into play various muscles, while the rhythm and motion remove from the child's mind the suggestion of work and generates a pleasurable feeling. The children are now in the right attitude of mind and body for the *Good-Bye Song*. This should not be chosen at random: it has an important function to perform for the child that is quite apart from vocal culture. There are many available songs for this exercise in our kindergarten song books, as for example:

“’Tis time to go, how soon it comes,
We lay our work aside,
And hasten to our happy homes,
Where joy and peace abide.
With footsteps light and voices gay,
We’re going home, so now Good Day.”

It is scarcely necessary to call attention to the good that may be accomplished by a song like this in properly relating the ideas of home and school to each other in the minds of the children. When at the close of this song the children kneel in prayer, in imagination they are already by their mothers' knee and the ideas of the earthly and the heavenly homes are linked together in little minds that are filled with joyous anticipation.

The afternoon program is so similar to that of the forenoon that it is scarcely necessary to comment upon it here. Play, as will be seen, is given a large place in the first day's program, but it is not play for its own sake, nor is the play the fundamental thing. It is used merely as a means of developing self-reliance, freedom and grace of movement, social activities and mental coördinations. In this subordinate place play performs the role intended for it by nature and as the days go by it will gradually and naturally give place to occupations in which play has a less evident part.

THE NEW BASIS FOR MORALITY IN OUR PUBLIC SCHOOLS.

Many men who have read the articles by Harold Bolce in the *Cosmopolitan* for May and June appear to be incredulous as to the conditions prevailing in our universities as therein revealed. It does not seem to them possible that conditions can be as bad as represented and they feel inclined to question the fairness of Mr. Bolce's statements on the ground that they are mere excerpts taken out of lectures without the setting and the context which would essentially modify their meaning. To such one of two courses is open: first, to go to the universities and trust to their own ears and eyes; and secondly, to turn to the literature that these men are producing. This latter course is accessible to many who, from various circumstances, would find it impossible to adopt the former. A course of such reading will prepare these objectors to understand the situation as portrayed by Mr. Bolce.

It is hard for the man of everyday common sense to realize that the country is paying large salaries to an army of several thousand professors to undermine the foundations of morality, religion and citizenship. Indeed, Mr. Bolce hastens to assure us that this is not precisely the case, that there are many men in the universities who are not preaching these new doctrines. But it is also well to remember that the men preaching these doctrines are in the universities in sufficient number and in positions, such as the chairs of Economics, Sociology, Ethics, His-

tory, etc., to complete the work of destruction in the minds of the vast population of our university students. The unformed minds and characters of boys are unable to resist "the scholarly repudiation of all solemn authority" and the statement from the rostrum that "the Decalogue is no more sacred than a syllabus." When these professors "teach young men and women plainly that an immoral act is merely one contrary to the prevailing conceptions of society and that the daring who defy the code do not offend any Deity but simply arouse the venom of the majority" they not only attack the truths of supernatural religion but also ethical foundations as contained in natural law. This is in line with the other statements which Mr. Bolce quotes, such as that "there are no absolute evils," "that marriage as now contracted and protected is a form of monopoly interwoven with capital, conducive to exclusive families and the culture-ground of family pride and ambition," that "it is not right to set up a technical legal relationship, an economic convenience, or a circumstance of social conventionality as morally superior to the spontaneous preference of a man and woman who know, and whose friends know, that they love each other," and that "there can be and are holier alliances without the marriage bond than within it," and that "every normal man or woman has room for more than one person in his heart," and that "like politics and religion we have taken it for granted that the marriage relationship is right and have not questioned it."

That such teaching is very general in the universities is a familiar fact to those who are acquainted with our university life, but there are few who realize the extent to which this poison has spread in the teaching staffs of our normal schools and secondary institutions of learning. The spirit of irreligion is reaching down at present to the children in the primary grades and depriving them of the support of religion and morality. To any one who feels disposed to question this statement we recommend the perusal of the Dopp series of readers which are now being used in many of our public schools. This series was commented on in a previous number of the *Bulletin*. The effort is made in this series of readers to exclude all re-

ligious teaching from the mind of the child and to find the basis of human conduct in animal instincts. An examination of this set of books would seem to be sufficient in itself to discredit the theory on which the books were based. But we do not need to trust to the concrete embodiment in text-books of these principles; they are openly defended and their philosophy formulated by professors in the universities and by teachers in our normal schools and colleges. In the last number of the *Bulletin* attention was called to such a defence from the pen of Professor Schroeder, of Whitewater, Wisconsin. Professor Dewey undertakes a similar task in a recent number of the *Hibbert Journal*. This policy emanating from our universities and reaching out to control the policy of education in all our primary and secondary schools is clearly expressed by Daniel Wolford LaRue, of Augusta, Me., in the May number of the *Educational Review*, under the title of *The Church and the Public Schools*, which we recommend to the careful study of all who would understand the prevalent policy of our public school system towards religion and morality. Mr. LaRue says (page 468): "One of the most general proposals is that some arrangement be made whereby Church and school can work together in religious and moral training. While this at first seems feasible enough, we are forced to remember that the public school is a state institution and that consequently, so long as church and state remain separate so long must church and school remain separate. If any sort of intimate alliance is contemplated, it is not only impossible from a practical standpoint it is undesirable as well and for the following reasons: (1) The church seems to assume that, through revelation, it has a final settlement of truth, religious truth, at least. It does not favor experimentation and laboratory methods in its own province. This attitude encourages stagnation, fossilization on a certain plane, and contentment with imperfection. The child has a right to progress, to be better than his fathers spiritually, as well as in the mastery of the material universe." We will deal with each of Mr. LaRue's six reasons in succession. We must protest against Mr. LaRue's statement in the name of science and philosophy as well as in the name of religion even

if our attitude is that of stagnation and fossilization, because we believe that the church through revelation has the final settlement of religious truth and because we do not encourage the laboratory method as the final test of revealed truth. But lest we should be suspected of soreness in the matter, on account of the crude treatment which Mr. LaRue gives to our most cherished convictions, we will in this instance call upon Mr. Huxley to deal with the situation. Writing in answer to certain accusations of Mr. Lilly's, Mr. Huxley says: "The third thesis runs that I put aside 'as unverifiable everything which cannot be brought into a laboratory and dealt with chemically'; and, once more, I say no. This wondrous allegation is no novelty; it has not unfrequently reached me from that region where gentle (or ungente) dulness so often holds unchecked sway—the pulpit. But I marvel to find that a writer of Mr. Lilly's intelligence and good faith is willing to father such a wastrel. If I am to deal with the thing seriously, I find myself met by one of the two horns of a dilemma. Either some meaning, as unknown to usage as to the dictionaries, attaches to 'laboratory' and 'chemical,' or the proposition is (what am I to say in my sore need for a gentle and yet appropriate word?)—well—unhistorical. Does Mr. Lilly suppose that I put aside 'as unverifiable' all the truths of mathematics, of philology, of history? And if I do not, will he have the great goodness to say how the binomial theorem is to be dealt with 'chemically,' even in the best-appointed 'laboratory'; or where the balances and crucibles are kept by which the various theories of the nature of the Basque language may be tested; or what reagents will extract the truth from any given History of Rome, and leave the errors behind as a residual calx? I really cannot answer these questions, and unless Mr. Lilly can, I think he would do well hereafter to think more than twice before attributing such preposterous notions to his fellow-men, who after all, as a learned counsel said, are vertebrated animals."²

Poor Huxley got many hard blows in his day, but he is at

² Huxley, Thomas, *Evolution and Ethics and other Essays*. New York, 1894, pp. 124-5.

least saved the pain of this accusation from a brother of the faith scientific. He was quite unaware that he was encouraging "stagnation, fossilization and contentment with imperfection" when he repudiated the laboratory method in dealing with certain scientific matters not to speak of those higher regions where supernatural truth is at home. Our Saviour taught the children of Israel in parables that in His own statement were as seeds that were to grow with the advancing years. The Church was not to fossilize or to remain content with imperfection; and, as a matter of fact, it has unceasingly urged men forward to higher planes of perfection. But Mr. LaRue seems as ignorant of the development of doctrine as he is of the nature of religion or the scope and principles of the teachings of Christ. We are not therefore surprised by his second count.

"(2) The Church is unpedagogical and unsystematic in its teaching, particularly in the attempt to force mature ideas and habits of conduct upon the child. Any ordinary Sunday school will furnish abundant evidence of this." Comment is scarcely necessary here. Modern pedagogy is just groping its way back towards the great fundamental principles of pedagogy that are embodied in Christ's method of teaching and in the organic teaching of the Church. Besides, the "Notes on Education," running in the current numbers of the *Bulletin* are in themselves sufficient refutation of Mr. LaRue's dogmatic accusation. It will be news to many that the Church's teaching is unsystematic. But the Church does hold up the highest ideals of adult life before the child and she expects her children to begin on the high plane of Christian morality and not on the plane of savages or prehistoric man. She does expect reverence and other virtues which are absurdities to Mr. LaRue and those who think with him.

"(3) The Church bases morality upon that which, from a rationalistic standpoint (the standpoint of the school), is unessential in a moral code. The unwisdom of this appears when the unessential comes to be doubted, as is frequently the case." It is interesting to note that the standpoint of the school is rationalistic. But who is the school? Whence does it derive its infallibility? What right has it to impose a standpoint with

reference to morality upon the children of the nation. The Church does base morality upon fundamental truths, such as the Fatherhood of God, the brotherhood of man, and the unchanging nature of natural law as well as upon the revealed will of God. She does not and cannot regard such truths as unessential and when they are doubted and discredited morality suffers. In her eyes, therefore, the greatest enemies of society are those who abuse their position as paid instructors of our children by destroying their faith in the great fundamental truths on which our civilization rests. The child must receive the inherited wisdom of the past through the channels of authority or he cannot receive it at all. To condemn the child to receive nothing but what he verifies by his individual intelligence is to condemn him to mental and moral starvation. He can no more conquer the whole world of truth for himself unaided by the intelligence of the past than he could wrest from nature in the years of infancy sustenance and support for his physical organism. All such procedure is in direct violation of modern pedagogy; it is a violation of all that we have learned from the sciences of embryology and genetic psychology.

"(4) Many of the churches regard man as by nature perverse and evil. Psychology teaches that an idea persistently repeated and emphasized in this way exerts a subtle influence by the power of suggestion and tends to work itself out in conduct. We develop according to our prevailing mental attitude." The Catholic Church has never consented to the doctrine of the corruption of human nature through the sin of Adam and the Catholic Church is a very large factor in this question, since she maintains a separate public school system at her own expense which is now educating nearly one and a half millions of our children. If any church perverts religious truth in this way, or natural truth, it is in so far blameworthy, but Mr. LaRue should give proof of a statement so sweeping as this.

"(5) The churches seem to underestimate character, developed for its own sake, and deny its sufficiency unless it is properly indoctrinated." Yes, the Church does not believe that a tree will bear fruit unless it has roots and sap, and she has no faith

in the resemblances to the genuine fruit which may be produced in any other way than through the natural agencies and she disbelieves in character that is not backed up by conviction of underlying truth. A mere habit of action without a reason back of it is a very frail thing; too frail to serve as a foundation for society. And the strength or value of character can never be greater than the strength of the beliefs on which it rests. "If this be treason, make the most of it." It is the dictum of common sense, the result of experience, and the conclusion of psychology.

"(6) The Church, apparently, cultivates the spirit of other-worldliness, preaching the doctrine of escape from present evils, and pointing from here to the hereafter for its justification. The school desires more that humanistic spirit which thrills at the rare joy of living here and now, of facing evils and facing them down, of living in one world at a time and living conqueringly. We are not merely pilgrims and strangers. We have staked our claim and mean to defend it." So the case is plain. This group of self-confessed rationalists, we hope the term will not offend, as we really cannot find a milder one, assume the right to dictate the policy of the schools and their spirit. They assume the right to speak in the name of the school and to reject all belief in a world beyond the grave and all motive and sanction drawn from any source beyond the present and the material. They have staked their claim and mean to defend it. Now, from the standpoint of evolution, nothing is clearer than this that the individual must be subordinated at all times to the race. This is accomplished in the lower forms of life through the instrumentality of instinct. But in human life, in order to secure a better and a more rapid adjustment to a changing environment, conduct emanates from free will under the guidance of intelligence, but this leads to life only when the fundamental laws of life are observed and when the common good is held unalterably above individual desire. Now, history proves that just as man loses his faith in God and in eternal life he loses the power to hold himself true to such fundamental natural law as the subjugation of the individual to the species and the result is the extinction of the race. This

drama has been enacted over and over again in the civilizations of the past and it is to-day taking place under our eyes where we see that faith and fecundity are still linked together in their old inseparable union and that fecundity disappears with faith. One need not, therefore, fall back on the teaching of the Church in order to show that men like Mr. LaRue are the greatest enemies of society. The teaching of science itself brands such policies as he advocates for our public schools as destructive of the race.

While Mr. LaRue's article shows the animus that prevails in the body of men who are seeking to control the doctrine and policy of our public schools, it is strangely devoid of proof. Its statements are unsupported by fact or argument for the most part. "As a matter of fact, religion (in the narrow sense) and moral conduct do not necessarily have much to do with each other. Many religions are highly immoral. If we taught religion seven days in the week and compelled the pupils to pass a monthly test in it, we could not feel in the least assured that we had advanced one whit in morality. It would more likely be a sign of frantic retrogression." On the same page with this bald statement, without any apparent consciousness of the inconsistency involved, we find the following: "The child should feel the common impulse of patriotism first, and choose his party by reflection when he comes to maturity. Just as all political parties are seeking the same thing, namely, the best form of government, so all religious denominations are seeking the same thing, namely, right relations with the universe, which some of them call 'God.'" This notwithstanding the fact that "many religions are highly immoral"!

It is interesting to know that "the school does not object to exercises that are *devotional* in the sense of encouraging devotion to duty, to humanity, to the cause of righteousness; it does object to the indoctrination of a young child with a particular creed or catechism and regards as positively vicious any effort to extort from him vows and promises whose seriousness he does not appreciate but which he may later be called upon to fulfill." In Mr. LaRue's view there is a great and incurable wrong inflicted on each child who is brought into the world

without first having been consulted and without knowing in the least the seriousness of the step it was taking! Can the present ever escape from its indebtedness to the past and can we ever rise to higher levels except the energy of each present moment be added to the next? But it is folly to argue a question of this kind with a man who has so little comprehension of the laws of mental life and of the principles underlying the growth and development of character. "The religion of the school," according to Mr. LaRue, "may be defined as a dynamic appreciation of the relation of the individual to the universe. Non-sectarian instruction, in developing its concept of the self and the Super-self, does not care to go beyond the facts that have been fairly well established by science. These—perhaps too many of them—are already in our curriculums. Of course, nothing concerning the fall of man, his natural depravity, or any scheme of salvation, can appear. In place of the partisan devotion of the religious zealot, the school aims to develop some appreciation of the great worth and natural dignity of man; of his sympathetic relation with all sentient life, particularly his fellow-men; of the value, in his development, of universal peace; of the vast possibilities of future progress; of the necessity of shaping our lives in accordance with law; of the fact that our world is rational and good; of the importance of accepting in cheerful faith—precisely the same kind of faith we exercise in our fellow-men—the goodness of all we cannot now see and understand. So far as the practical regulation of conduct is concerned, the school offers what the Church has never even seriously attempted, namely, a social laboratory in which to develop a moral code experimentally, an opportunity to put into practice, under helpful supervision, every item of knowledge gained. The child is led to *know* himself and his world, to *trust* them both, and to work the will of both harmoniously." No, thank God, the Church does not offer laboratories in which the children may discover for themselves experimentally a serviceable moral code. The wisdom of a hundred generations is at hand in the Church's treasury to guide the actions of children and to supply to the child and the adult a moral code that has stood the test of time and has the stamp of Divine authority

upon it. But we feel like begging pardon for interrupting Mr. LaRue. He must speak for himself. No description could do justice to the standard of morality which he proposes that our public schools shall furnish to the children of the nation and which, according to Messrs, Dewey, Schroeder and Company, they are now furnishing our children.

“‘But,’ the Church may ask, ‘what about the more special ecclesiastical virtues, such as reverence?’ Reverence! What has a young child to do with reverence? He cannot feel it, for the simple reason that it is a late growth, and he has not developed the nervous machinery to feel it with. He cannot even understand us when we speak of it. Superstitious fear he knows, and consequently the taboo is always effective. He has a horror of the ‘boogerman,’ concerning whom we so glibly lie to him. But our idea of God—if it is really of any account from an adult standpoint—he simply cannot grasp. So with reverence and other similar spiritual qualities. Here is illustrated a statement made previously, *i. e.*, that the Church attempts to force mature ideas and modes of action upon the child. It seems not to have learned the value of an historical approach to the science of conduct. Baby man was an alchemist before he was a chemist, an astrologer before he was an astronomer. Baby boy represents something like the barbarian stage morally. The niceties of polite life are to him so much frippery and foolishness, and rightly so. So-called irreverence, disobedience, and impudence are but the first crude expressions of a fiery, straight-forward, independent nature—something to thank God for, not to wail over. We should have no haste with our punishments; nature and society are the best reformers. The child must experiment morally, discover a few ethical affinities and spiritual atomic weights. He will know, as soon as we, when the equation doesn’t balance. We need only see that the explosions are not too serious and that he does not pour the acids too recklessly.”

What refutation could anyone desire more eloquent than this naïve expression of the spirit of secularism? For those who wish to have their children grow up in a school atmosphere from which religion is banished and who wish that they should dis-

cover for themselves a workable ethical code from early experiments, we commend them to the schools that are dominated by such men as Mr. LaRue. And if they would know how the experiments are carried out, we must once more ask them to give careful attention to the Industrial and Social History Series, by Katherine Dopp, of the Chicago University. We must remember, however, that it is not our own children that are here imperiled but the morality and life of the nation. After enumerating what he considers the 'essential qualities' of good citizenship, Mr. LaRue continues. "It is needless, however, to be careful and troubled about so many things. All that is necessary is to attach the child by personal affection to a few good heroes whom he will love and imitate up to and through the critical period of puberty, typified by the great Adamic fable of the fall of man. As soon as reflection begins, he must do what the race did, discover what ideal there is potential within him and be as loyal to it as he can. That, roughly stated, is all." But we should exercise care that Jesus Christ and the saints be not the heroes in question, for these, according to Mr. LaRue, are superstitious and vicious imposters who would foster other-worldliness, and a cowardly avoidance of evils here by taking refuge in a world of ignorance. The one thing that Mr. LaRue seems sure of is that religion furnishes no support to morality. He says: "There seems to be a common impression that, because every religion embraces a moral code of some sort, morality is inseparable from religion. It is commonly stated that a man who does not believe in God and a hereafter has no reason for living a good life. The absurdity of such statements is not fully apparent until we have outgrown the superstition and fear that prompt them. Ethics can stand on its own feet,—that is, in the same sense in which astronomy, chemistry, or physics can do so. The last science to be rescued from the bondage of religion is the science of human conduct. It is true that underneath every science remains that which we do not fully know—call it 'God' if you will." No, Mr. LaRue, call it religion, for that is evidently the thing you know least about. "The school," *i. e.*, Mr. LaRue and the rationalists, "not only affirms the independence of ethics, but is also inclined to regard

it as a grave mitsake, to say the least, to teach a child that the moral code is an outgrowth of anything that commonly passes under the name of 'religion.' It is this very error that has made mothers afraid to send their sons to college, and caused them to regard the college as a destroyer of faith and a corruptor of morals." Would to God there were more such mothers in the land, who would see to it that their sons received a college education in a Christian atmosphere and under teachers who still believed in the Ten Commandments, notwithstanding the fact that they got mixed up somehow with God and religion. Mr. La Rue's account of the immorality of our young college men is interesting: "The college boy, finding, as his knowledge and insight increase, that the family minister had no right to so much certainty as he assumed with regard to God's thoughts and acts and the general psychology of the Divine, suspects his former teachers—or rather, preachers—and 'loses his religion.' With the foundation collapses the superstructure, morality. First the catechism then the cataclysm." The remedy for the immorality among our juvenile school population is worthy of close attention. "The school should pay first heed to physical examination, physical culture, and the laws of hygiene. Most juvenile immorality will disappear as soon as we do our duty in this direction." Does Mr. LaRue propose the physical examination of every school child and the use of syringes, etc., by school authorities? It would seem so, for he continues: "(2) The school falls short of its duty in the matter of encouraging purity, especially purity in matters of sex. School authorities are aware of this, and they know the remedy, but a prudish public drags the wheels. We ought to be ashamed of our shame and blush at our own modesty. The Church, too, halts at this point. As history shows, sexual passion and religious fervor are closely associated; an attempt to control the one through the other would probably be less successful than to make teaching more purely intellectual, associating it with the physiology and hygiene of the school curriculum."

Finally, Mr. LaRue sums up. "The one thing needful is that we recognize that moral principles are real in the same sense in which other forces are real; that they are inherent in com-

munity life and in the running machinery of the individual. If we can secure a genuine faith in this fact, we shall have secured the only condition which is finally necessary in order to get from our educational system all the effectiveness there is in it. The teacher who operates in this faith will find every subject, every method of instruction, every incident of school life pregnant with ethical life." Yes, in the hands of these people everything in the school is made effective in destroying the child's faith in God and in destroying his belief in the authority of ethical precepts. These are the very men who, according to Harold Bolce, declare that "the home, once the cradle of the race, has become the breeding-place of woe, ignorance, inefficiency and debt." These are the men who "teach young men and women plainly that an immoral act is merely one contrary to the prevailing conceptions of society; and that the daring who defy the code do not offend any Deity, but simply arouse the venom of the majority—the majority that has not yet grasped the new idea."

Harold Bolce's articles are significant, showing as they do the prevalent attitude of our college teachers. But Mr. LaRue and others are serving to bring home to us the realization that teaching of this sort is not confined to colleges, it is reaching down through the whole system of our public schools, corrupting and destroying the faith and morals of the little children of the nation. What wonder that fifteen thousand children in the city of Chicago alone were arraigned in the criminal courts in one year! If our busy public will ever take sufficient time to learn what is being taught our children in schools and colleges supported out of the public treasury, a vigorous remedy will be found.

THOMAS EDWARD SHIELDS.

BOOK REVIEWS.

The Divine Story, a short life of Our Blessed Lord written specially for young people, by Rev. Cornelius Joseph Holland, S. T. L. Providence, Joseph M. Tally, 1909. Pp. ix + 223.

In the last few decades we have had several lives of Christ, either originally written or translated into English from French or German. Many of these are erudite works designed to meet the needs of the theologian and the New Testament scholar. But there is not to be found in the English language any volume to compete with this in meeting the needs of the young. It is true that Mother Loyola has given us in *Jesus of Nazareth* a volume for which every teacher of the young will always be grateful. But Father Holland's charming little book presents the matter in an entirely different way. Here we have the story of the Gospels not expanded but adjusted to the need and the capacity of the child and of the young man or woman. There is nothing of importance left out, nor is matter of mere tradition or pious belief so mingled with the authentic record as in any way to endanger the enduring faith which the book is almost sure to awaken in the heart of the young reader. In fact, while the simplicity of the narrative will appeal at once to the child's understanding, the man will never outgrow its statement of fact. With maturer years there will of course arise a demand for greater fulness of detail and for a discussion of the deeper meanings of the great problems discussed by the Master.

It has been too frequently taken for granted that the child-mind was incapable of receiving great fundamental truths unless, indeed, they were couched in exact formulas and committed to memory where they were to remain until the mind unfolded sufficiently to lift them up into its structure. As a consequence those who aimed at meeting the child's intelligence frequently offered only the trivial or the details. If it was to hold the child's attention, the story was supposed to center around the child's play or to deal with fairies or children's pets in the animal world. In the *Divine Story* Father Holland, with a fine appreciation of the child's capacity, as well as a clear comprehension of what Our Lord's life and works mean to the race, presents to the child in simple outline all the great mysteries of the Christian

religion and the beautiful lessons that dropped from the lips of the Master, while the personality of Christ stands out so clearly and so attractively to the child that his interest will be maintained throughout the narrative. Father Holland has rendered an incalculable service to the children of the English-speaking world in thus placing within their reach in connected form the story of Our Lord's life and teaching. The book might well be read to children in the first and second grades; the children in the third grade will read the book for themselves without difficulty. The print is clear, the sentences short, the style direct and graceful. The book contains eight fine illustrations in sepia. The headings of the thirty-three chapters into which the book is divided, indicate the sequence of the thought: In a Stable at Bethlehem; The Eighth and Fortieth Days; The Three Wise Men; The Wrath of a Wicked King; In Obscurity; On the Banks of the Jordan and in a Desert; The Apostles; At a Wedding Feast; In the Temple; Friends and Neighbors; Missionary Labors; A Paralytic's Faith; Enemies; A Storm at Sea; Living Bread; In a Heathen Land; A Revelation of Glory; New Enemies; Brotherly Love; God's Mercy; God's Compassion; Hosannas; The Beginning of the End; In the Valley of the Shadow of Death; Arrested; Tried; Condemned; Crucified, Dead, and Buried; The Third Day; Alive Again; The Risen Life; Concluding Labors; The Return to Heaven.

The Introduction to the book will serve further to make clear its scope and purpose. "Wherever one goes nowadays,—whether through the streets of his own city, or into the cities round about, or to far-off, unknown places,—he is almost certain to see some church spire, rising gracefully above surrounding buildings, and lifting a gilded cross to heaven; for everywhere, at the present time, the people know and serve God, in spirit and in truth.

"But it was not always so. There was a time, far back in the ages of the past, when no one knew or served the One, True God; but when, in every city, town and village, the people adored images of wood and brass and stone, and served them, without shame, in wickedness and sin.

"The change from those dread days to ours was brought about by Our Blessed Saviour. For it was He who, coming down to earth as man, made known the truths about God and holiness, and founded the Church which has spread these truths abroad, and offered up His life as a satisfaction for the sins of all the world.

"The entire Jewish nation might have had the glory of being used by the Saviour as the foundations of His Church. For they had been

particularly favored by God, --having received a true religion, and having been rightly instructed by teachers, known as Prophets, and having been given a Promise that the Saviour would come to earth as one of them. But they lost the spirit of their religion, put to death the Prophets, and changed the Promise of a Saviour to mean a great and splendid King, whom they called the Christ or the Messias, was going to come to make them the most powerful nation in the world, and when the Saviour came, instead of becoming His assistants, they regarded Him as an impostor, and inflicted on Him His sin-atonement death. Hence the glory of acting as the foundations of the Church was obtained by just a little group of men whom the Saviour trained, and endowed with His own miraculous powers, and sent forth in His name.

"The story of how Our Saviour did all this,—of how He came, and made known His truths, and founded His Church, and died at the hands of the Jewish nation,—is the divinest story in the history of the world. To know it well, is to be led to look upon Our Lord, not as One who lived and died, ages and ages ago, but as an ever-present Friend,—only more winsome, more precious, more lovable, and more generous than any merely earthly friend could ever be.

"It is the desire that an ever greater and greater number of people, especially of young people, may be led to look upon Our Lord in this sweet familiar way, that the following pages have been written."

Father Holland has certainly accomplished what he set out to do and it is to be hoped that the book may find its way into the hands of every Christian child in the land.

THOMAS EDWARD SHIELDS.

Histoire des Commandements de l'Eglise. Par M. l'abbé Villien, professeur à l'Institut Catholique de Paris. 1 vol. in 12. Paris, Lecoffre, 1909. Pp. xii + 353.

The need of a History of the Commandments of the Church has long been felt in the Catholic world generally. The subject was, admittedly, of great interest, yet before the author of the present work no historian of institutions devoted to it more than cursory attention. The Abbé Villien, therefore, is the benefactor of the Catholic clergy of France for supplying them with a volume which will prove a highly useful auxiliary in the preparation of catechetical instructions; it is to be hoped that the clergy of the English-speaking world will soon become their co-beneficiaries, when some enterprising Catholic publish-

ing house will place at their disposal, in a good translation, a book which is at the same time learned and practical.

From the first page of this work to the last the interest of the reader does not flag for a moment. To most of us, for example, the opening chapter on the variations in the number of the Commandments of the Church, in different ages and in different countries, will be somewhat of a revelation. This chapter is followed by one on the development of the Church's legislation regarding the obligation of assisting at Mass, from apostolic times to our own day. In a second chapter devoted to another phase of the first commandment we have traced for us the interesting history of the enactments of Church and State prohibiting servile works on the Lord's Day, and of the various sanctions under which these enactments were enforced. The fourth chapter treats of the feasts, other than Sundays, on which the faithful were obliged to hear Mass and refrain from manual labor; the fifth and sixth are concerned with the paschal confession and communion, and the seventh and eighth with the obligation of fasting and abstinence. In a final chapter the author deals with the legislation on the subject of tithes.

The work combines admirably two qualities we expect as a matter of course from the best type of French historian: attractiveness of style and profundity of research. The author has laboriously examined all the documents bearing on his subject, whether decrees of council, civil legislation, or allusions in ecclesiastical treatises, the result being that the reader finds himself in possession of a very readable, as well as reliable work of reference.

MAURICE M. HASSETT.

Germany in the Early Middle Ages, 476-1250. By William Stubbs, D. D., formerly Bishop of Oxford and Regius Professor of Modern History in the University of Oxford. Edited by Arthur Hassell, M. A., London, (Longmans), 1908. Pp. vi + 254.

The name of the author and the title of his work taken together arouse expectations in the lover of Medieval History which unfortunately will not be fulfilled in more than a very moderate degree. Most things, indeed, that Bishop Stubbs has written on Medieval History are worth reading and even the present volume will, to a certain extent, repay perusal. But this is about all that can be said in its favor. For in the first place it is hopelessly out of date, consisting as

it does of lectures delivered thirty-five or forty years ago, on a period of history which in the meantime has occupied the close attention of a host of specialists. But even in the event of their having been edited in accordance with the generally accepted modifications of opinion effected by four decades of historical research the lectures would still be too summary to be of great practical value. The reign of Henry IV, for instance, occupies only eleven pages, that of Frederick Barbarossa less than twenty pages. The Editor, however, regards the author's appreciations of the German monarchs of the Middle Ages as especially valuable, a claim which will by no means win general assent. Take as an example Bishop Stubbs' estimate of Frederick Barbarossa. This Emperor, we are assured, very nearly reached the pinnacle of perfection. He was both lovable and admirable, more admirable even than Charlemagne. He was also a type of "the full beauty of the German character in its strength, its purity, its kindness and patience, its gentleness and good faith coupled with . . . the knightly deportment of the medieval cavalier," (p. 212). After reading this character sketch the reader is inclined to inquire whether the author is really speaking of Frederick Barbarossa. For surely to talk of the patience, gentleness and good faith of this particular specimen of a Holy Roman Emperor borders on the absurd; Bishop Stubbs must have known that to assign his hero characteristics the opposite of each of these would be very much nearer the truth. As a specimen of Frederick's good faith take one of his letters to Pope Alexander III. After deliberately creating a schism in the Church, by refusing to recognize the indisputable validity of Alexander's election, and recognizing an anti-Pope who had not the shadow of a claim to the papal throne, Frederick invited the Pope to submit the entire question to a council of his convening, and which he dominated. Despite the well known facts of the case the Emperor, in the letter alluded to, calls heaven to witness that his only thought throughout has been peace and the restoration of the unity of the Church! As to the gentleness of Barbarossa, the Milanese, we imagine, would tell a different story from that of our author. Nor could they be greatly blamed for differing in this matter from the late Bishop of Oxford, seeing that all of them that fell into the hands of the humane Frederick during the siege of their city had their eyes put out and their hands cut off. Neither would the events subsequent to the fall of their city necessitate a revision of their ideas of Frederick's humanity, since every man, woman and child in Milan found themselves mercilessly driven from their homes and their city razed by order of their conqueror. And

this fomentor of schism, this cruel warrior, this ruler, the best years of whose life were devoted to the destruction of liberty in Church and State, Bishop Stubbs regards as an object of admiration more worthy than Charlemagne. Surely it is only the incurable Erastianism of a State-Church Bishop that could reach such a conclusion.

MAURICE M. HASSETT.

Prim und Komplet des Römischen Breviers liturgisch und aszetisch erklärt. Von Dr. Nikolaus Gühr (Theologische Bibliothek). Freiburg i. B.: Herder, 1907. 8°, pp. viii + 339. \$1.85.

While yet an adherent of the Anglican confession of faith, Cardinal Newman wrote these remarkable words about the Office of the Catholic Church: "There is so much of excellence and beauty in the services of the Breviary that were it skilfully set before the Protestant by Roman controversialists as the book of devotion received in their communion, it would undoubtedly raise a prejudice in their favor." . . . (*Tracts for the Times*, No. 75). The deep, sincere, refined expression of religious sentiment, which appealed so strongly to the profound religious genius of Newman, must prove attractive to all who are sufficiently acquainted with the official prayers of the Church to recognize their intrinsic worth.

The work of Dr. Gühr is calculated to render helpful service to every one who wishes to acquire a fuller knowledge of the Breviary and thereby to deepen his piety in the recitation of the divine office. As the subject-matter of his splendid volume he has selected the liturgical morning and evening services of the Church as we find them in the official edition since the time of Pius V. The danger of a superficial, perfunctory, mechanical recitation of the divine office lies nearest precisely in those devotions which admit only of the slightest variations and which recur daily in the same stereotyped form. Perhaps the most effective safeguard against all undesirable routine work in the performance of this religious duty is a diligent study of the liturgical texts and formulas. Suitable books for meditation are not easily procured and are frequently sought in vain by the Catholic priest, while at the same time any passage of the Missal, the Ritual or the Breviary would furnish choice material for pious reflection and contemplation; for it is here that we have the most expressive manifestation of the inner Christian life. Under the guidance of the learned

author, the reader will be able to penetrate deeply into the sense of the liturgical texts and to appreciate the treasures of thought contained in the formal ecclesiastical devotions. The single verses of the Psalms, the Responses, Versicles and Orations are subjected to an exegesis that is ample and detailed. The explanation yields a wealth of spiritual ideas and considerations in the light of which the prayers acquire a new significance and force. Passages of Sacred Scripture, selections from the Fathers and from standard theological treatises, and appropriate extracts from profane writers are skilfully woven into the presentation which is both pleasing and instructive. In the employment of quotations to illustrate his commentary Dr. Gühr shows a decided preference for the beautiful lyrics of the author of the *Dreizehnlinden*.

It is a pleasure to note that the history of these devotions has not been neglected. Where the sacred liturgy is concerned we are often content to accept the good that comes to us without enquiring how it came, although few things could be more interesting than a knowledge of the origin and development of the prayers which we daily recite. In a manner which harmonizes well with the scope of his work the author sketches briefly the history of the two canonical hours which he explains. He points out that the Vigils, Lauds and Vespers belong to the oldest traditional element of the ancient public worship, and shows how the piety of the Christian people added Terce, Sext and None in the course of the following centuries. Monastic influence in the East and West finally led to the adoption of Prime and Compline, thus bringing about the sevenfold number of the canonical hours of the day in conformity with scriptural suggestion.

We are indebted to Dr. Gühr for a very useful and excellent work. Few writings will be found more helpful in furthering the spirit of genuine piety and in rendering the recitation of the divine office that which it must necessarily be, a worship in spirit and in truth.

ALOYSIUS MENGES, O. S. B.

Der Tabernakel einst und jetzt. Von Felix Raible. Aus dem Nachlass des Verfassers herausgegeben von Dr. Engelbert Krebs. Freiburg (Herder), 1908. Pp. xxii + 336.

The author of this posthumous work was a German parish priest who for many years devoted his leisure hours to the study of the documents, ancient, medieval and modern, bearing on the origin and

development of the tabernacle. The book, which is dedicated to the members of the Priests' International Eucharistic League, is a worthy monument to the industry of the author, to whose knowledge of his subject, and earnest devotion to the Sacrament of the Altar, it bears abundant evidence. It will in a great measure fulfill the purpose for which it was written, namely, to serve as a manual containing reliable information for the use of priests who may be called upon to oversee the construction of altars in their churches, and as an aid in giving instructions on the Eucharist. It will also prove useful to architects, and in general to the various classes of artists engaged in ecclesiastical decorative work.

In the matter of early Christian symbolism the author is generally disposed to adopt the views of the school of the extreme right, whereas the tendency of the more recent Catholic writers on Christian Archaeology is decidedly towards the center. He is inclined also to see in many ancient texts bearing on his subject very much more significance than the modern critical historian will admit them to possess. It is surprising not to find among his bibliography the title of Duchesne's *Origines du Culte Chrétien*, and on the other hand, his predilection for Probst will hardly receive the unreserved approval of the liturgists.

Ireland and St. Patrick. By William Bullen Morris. London and New York, 1907.

This is a new edition of the well-known work of Father Morris, first published in 1892. The position taken by the author in the chapter on "St. Patrick and St. Martin," as well as in that on "Adrian IV and Henry Plantagenet" is to-day untenable; the remaining chapters may still be read with some degree of interest.

MAURICE M. HASSETT.

Die Werke von Henry Charles Lea und verwandte Bücher. Nebst einer Auseinandersetzung mit dem Kölner Städtischen Archivar Professor Dr. Joseph Hansen. Von Paul Maria Baumgarten. Münster i. W., 1908. Pp. 142 + 1.

Henry Charles Lea's Historical Writings, a critical inquiry into their method and merit. By Paul Maria Baumgarten. New York, 1909. Pp. 200.

In this brochure Mgr. Baumgarten points out some of the most obtrusive inconsistencies, traceable to the author's ill-concealed dislike

of the Catholic Church, of Mr. Lea's voluminous works; but the reader will search in vain for the promised "critical inquiry into their method and merit." Such an inquiry would be, indeed, an impossibility within the space set for himself by the critic, but, restricted as this space is, it cannot be said that the author employs it to the best advantage. Here for instance are some samples of what we are asked to accept as criticism:

"Against such historical argument it seems impossible to reason with any prospect of success" (p. 21, translation); "Catholic theology has much to learn before it can boast of the acuteness of Lea's discernment" (p. 38). On pp. 49 and 50 the author quotes from Lea's *Inquisition in the Middle Ages* two paragraphs containing serious animadversions on the procedure of the inquisitorial courts, with the purpose, one naturally expects, of showing them to be unfounded. But Mgr. Baumgarten thinks it enough to inform us that the refutation we look for to him may be found in a certain number of the *Civiltà Cattolica*. He gives a brief quotation in Italian from the *Civiltà* writer to the effect that Lea's authorities say the exact opposite of what Lea pretends, and we entertain no doubt that this actually is the case. But why not give us the opportunity of judging for ourselves by citing and commenting on the original documents concerned? Had the author followed this method, and limited himself to, say a dozen examples of Lea's misinterpretations, his book would be of real service. But instead it is little more than a rough index of Lea's works, with observations of practically no value.

The English translation of Mgr. Baumgarten's book has faults of its own, independent of those of the original. The English, to say the least, leaves much to be desired, and in several instances we have noticed mistranslations. The term *Crusade*, apparently, is not familiar to the translator; we find him rendering the expression *das Kreuz predigte* by "preached the Holy Cross," *Geniale Quellenkritik* is translated "genial criticism of sources;" but better still is the rendering of *dazu fehlen ihm die Vorkenntnisse* by "he has no schooling in these matters!" The Council of Vienne is transformed into a hitherto unknown General Council of Vienna (pp. 60, 77). The fifth chapter on "German Editions of Lea's History of the Inquisition" should have been omitted as of no interest to the English reader.

MAURICE M. HASSETT.

The Dialogue of St. Catherine of Sienna. Translated by Algar Thorold. New York : Benziger Bros., 1907. Pp. 344.

This new abridged edition of the famous Treatise on Divine Providence of St. Catherine of Sienna will be welcomed by the numerous admirers of the Saint whose influence proved so powerful a factor in bringing to an end the Avignon captivity of the papacy. Mr. Thorold's translation is excellent.

A History of the Ancient Egyptians. By James Henry Breasted, Ph. D., with four maps and three plans,—fifth volume of the historical series for Bible students, edited by Professors C. F. Kent and T. K. Sanders. New York : Charles Scribner's Sons, 1908. Pp. xiii + 409.

This is not as one might think a simple condensation of the author's *History of Egypt* published three years before, with such additions and corrections as required by the latest research or discoveries. While using much of the same material as in his former work, the author has tried this time to write the history of a people, treating of the various aspects of the old Egyptian civilization, especially of its religious and political institutions as well as of its history proper both internal and external, down to the Persian invasion, which virtually marks the end of the Egyptian independence. The book is the work of a specialist and a teacher ; and everything in its arrangement and the presentation of the matter is calculated to increase its usefulness to students for whom it was primarily intended, yet it is easy and attractive reading and wonderfully adapted to meet the requirements of people of general culture.

H. HYVERNAT.

MEETING OF THE ALUMNI ASSOCIATION.

The fifteenth annual meeting of the Alumni Association of the Catholic University of America was held at the Hotel Astor in New York City on Tuesday, April 27. It was one of the best attended of the meetings thus far held by the Association, members of the society being present from many parts of the country. Among other business transacted at the meeting was the reading of Dr. Kerby's report on the Bouquillon Library Fund, from which it was learned that \$2,691.23 had been collected; the appointment given the Executive Committee to draw up a final draft of the Constitution of the Association to be submitted at the next reunion, and the instruction given the Secretary to have printed and distributed to all the members a complete list of the names and addresses of the Alumni.

REPORT OF THE HISTORIAN.

At the business meeting the historian, the Rev. George V. Leahy, S. T. L., of Boston, read a report which ran substantially as follows. He first announced his purpose "to chronicle briefly some of the doings of the past two years that are of special interest to this Society." He explained the necessity of going back two years instead of one, as due to the unavoidable absence of the historian from the previous meeting. He then continued:

"It is to the University *Bulletin* that we look, and seldom in vain, for the news of chief interest to us Alumni as, for example, events affecting the prosperity of our Alma Mater, the names of the new recipients of degrees, the literary ventures of our fellow-Alumni, and the like. To the *Bulletin*, indeed, I am indebted for most of the information incorporated in this paper.

"Perhaps the new recruits in the ranks of the Alumni deserve first to engage our attention. Two years ago, *i. e.*, in June,

1907, fourteen students were advanced to the higher honors, two laymen of Baltimore receiving the doctorate in law, four priests the doctorate in philosophy, and eight priests the licentiate in theology. Others to the number of twenty-eight received lesser degrees.

“ In June, 1908, it was interesting to read that Father Martin, of New York, a Licentiate in Theology from our university, had the honor of delivering the Baccalaureate Sermon. And at this commencement some fourteen had the pleasure and distinction of receiving the University's higher awards, one layman of Lewisburg, Pa., being made Doctor of Laws, one priest from Australia a doctor in Canon Law, one Father of the Holy Cross Order a Doctor in Philosophy, and eleven priests, among them five belonging to religious congregations, winning the Licentiate. Again many were advanced to minor degrees, twenty-four all told. We welcome all these graduates to our ranks none too large, and we congratulate the University on its sure and steady growth.

“ It is after graduation and not before for the most part that the University's sons are expected to bring her most honor. From what I know of the Alumni, I should say that they are almost to a man proving worthy of their training and are going far towards realizing the University's ideals, high as they are placed. Nearly all, it is true, have settled down to the ordinary works of the ministry, but I know of scarcely one who is not accomplishing his work in more than an ordinary manner. Several are teaching in seminaries and there spreading, perhaps in a feeble way, that rich light of truth and knowledge which they received in such bountiful measure and of such unexcelled quality at the University. A few have returned to the University as members of its teaching corps, the act bringing delight and pride to the entire body of the Alumni and increased efficiency, we feel sure, to the works of the University. A very few have mounted still higher, as the parochial clergy would esteem it, as permanent rectors in Boston, Washington and elsewhere, and one, Father Hayes, among the worthiest and best beloved of our associates, has been elevated by papal act to the dignity of Domestic Prelate. Forsaking my rôle of historian

for that of prophet, I was about to predict that still higher rank would be achieved by some in the future, when news came of the actual realization of this hope in the appointment of Father Carroll, of Philadelphia, one of the earlier alumni, to an episcopal see in the Phillipine Islands.

"There is one special field of endeavor in which we should naturally expect University men to be active above the ordinary, the field of literary output. Men with advantages as rare as ours ought certainly not hide our light, but dare to publish to the world the best results of our researches and reflections. Whether we have as yet done our share in this direction, it is hard to decide. But luckily there are enough Alumni with pen more or less constantly in hand to acquit us of the charge of absolute idleness. The well-known volumes of Father Russell and Dr. Shields, alumni of the first vintage, have this year been supplemented by a modest but useful life of our Lord, called *The Divine Story*, by Father Holland, of Providence, a licentiate of 1902. In the sociological field, all know what solid and mature work our fellow-alumni, Drs. Kerby and Ryan, have been contributing to periodical literature and from what high authorities have come encomiums of their publications. We scan the *Bulletin's* book reviews each month and feel sure of our safe guidance when we see the appended signatures of our professors at the University.

"All these are signs of activity of just the right sort, and the quality of the result has always, I believe, done honor to our Alma Mater and has risen well to the level of her high standards. May these labors increase in amount, without deterioration of quality. May the names of Catholic University graduates appear oftener and oftener in the future appended to publications of many sorts, in magazine articles, brochures, and even more pretentious works. Could the world be told in each case that the author is a Catholic University alumnus, would it not help advertise in a noble way the institution which is the object of our pride and love? May the work be extended and multiplied as the years roll on.

"Meantime we turn from our own humble efforts to look devotedly towards our Alma Mater, the home as we know it

of utmost and sincerest consecration to the wedded cause of truth and virtue. We have been interested in everyone of its happenings of the past two years, as happily heralded by the *Bulletin*. There were first our venerated Cardinal's reports of the annual collections. How these have cheered us and compelled our gratitude towards the generous Catholic people of this country, and driven deeper the roots of our gratitude and love for our venerable and eminent Chancellor. How it has gladdened us to learn of the generosity of the two Catholic fraternal orders, the Knights of Columbus and the Hibernians, proving their unity of ultimate aim, and at the same time testifying their trust in our beloved institution, by their pledge of liberal endowments. Eight scholarships already this year from the Hibernians and a promise of twenty-five before the year is done! And a pledge of half a million dollars from the Knights, what a magnificent and royal gift! If these strangers have such faith in our queen of colleges, how much more faith and devotion should be in us, her own favored children! Oh, we can never forget what we owe to her, her hospitable welcome and wise direction, the treasures of learning she poured into our lap, her inculcation of love for the truth above all things else, her high ideals of honor and manhood and, for us priests, of sacerdotal perfection. It all comes back to us now and in our hearts we know that we owe to our wise and pious mother an almost infinite debt. Let us sound her praises oftener than before that the world may learn what we have gained, that students may flock to her, not as formerly in knots and squads, but in companies and regiments, so that her halls shall be too small for all the eager, aspiring young men who will come to learn of her. There is no fear now that even numbers will ever lower her standards from the heights on which they are now placed. Her tone can scarcely suffer decline. Her accepted matriculates will be select men and none but these, or if of mediocre quality her inspiration if anything will lift them out of the rut of their mediocrity."

The historian paused here to mention briefly the death last year of Dr. Stafford and the recent demise of Mr. Charles Warren Stoddard, and in a few words paid due tribute to these

former esteemed professors of the University. He then proceeded:

"The last event to be chronicled, and the most pleasing of all, is the elevation of a professor of eighteen years' service to the office of Pro-Rector. If the selection has brought honor to the teaching corps, it has brought no less joy and gratification to the body of the Alumni. From almost the beginning of the University history, Dr. Shahan has served in the ranks, how sturdily and well everyone here will bear witness. Among University graduates up and down the land, no one, perhaps, is held in quite as high honor as he. We have esteemed him as our model scholar, so erudite and withal so modest, so laborious and yet so accessible and affable, a true priest and gentleman, and at the same time a giant and prince even among scholars of the first rank. Were it only for our admiration, we would all have rejoiced at his appointment. But when with this is blended affection such as his winning character has compelled, our pleasure at his advancement is beyond expression.

"We were already loyal and leal to our Alma Mater, we shall be doubly and deeply devoted now that Dr. Shahan is her chief guiding hand. May our careers bring him comfort and reward of heart as from the Rector's post he looks out upon the fruits of the University's training. And may next year's historian be able to chronicle for his satisfaction many additional achievements in the modest field of pastoral ministry and in the more difficult but perhaps more fruitful region of literary and forensic endeavor. For by such means even more than by our pledges of loyalty, however sincere, by our works and our steadfastness of lofty aim, we Alumni shall bring credit to our University and increase of joy to those who guide her destinies."

A pleasing feature of the meeting was the presence of Rev. Dr. Shahan. By an unanimous vote the Association extended to Dr. Shahan its congratulations upon his recent elevation to the dignity of Acting Rector of the University.

A vote of thanks was also given to the Alumni of New York and Brooklyn for their cordial hospitality and for their efforts in making the fifteenth annual meeting such a marked success.

The following were elected officers for the ensuing year :

President—Rev. William T. Russell, D. D.

1st Vice-President—Rev. William J. Kerby, Ph. D.

2nd Vice-President—Rev. Thomas F. Burke, C. S. P.

Secretary-Treasurer—Rev. John Webster Melody, D. D.

Historian—Rev. Joseph V. Leahy.

Executive Committee—Rev. Thomas McGuigan, Rev. Charles F. Aiken, D. D., Rev. Thomas Shields, Ph.D., Rev. William Fletcher, D. D., Rev. Michael J. Crane.

After the meeting followed the annual Banquet. In the absence of His Grace the Archbishop of New York, who was unable to attend, the toast "Our Holy Father" was responded to by Rt. Rev. Mgr. Joseph Mooney. Rev. Thomas F. Burke spoke on "Our Country." Hon. John J. Delaney responded to "The Catholic Layman." "The Alumni" was spoken to by Rev. Francis Duffy, while Dr. Shahan fittingly had for his toast "The Catholic University."

The speeches announced upon the program having been finished, the toastmaster called for a few words from several of the guests of the evening. In response felicitous addresses were made by the Hon. Eugene A. Philbin, Mr. Willis Moore, the Superintendent of the U. S. Weather Bureau, and Rt. Rev. Mgr. Charles McCready.

RIGHT REVEREND JAMES J. CARROLL,

Bishop of Nueva Segovia.

The new Bishop of Nueva Segovia, is the second alumnus of the University to be raised to the ranks of the episcopate.

James J. Carroll was born at Portland, Me., in 1863. At an early age he removed with his parents to St. Clair, Schuylkill County, Pennsylvania. After the usual course of philosophy and theology at St. Charles Seminary, Overbrook, he was ordained priest on June 15, 1889. On November 13, the opening day of the Catholic University, he was enrolled among the students of this Institution. During his two years of residence here he followed the courses given in Moral Theology by Dr. Bouquillon and in Hebrew by Dr. Hyvernatt. On March 29, 1890, he received the degree of Bachelor of Theology. On his return to Philadelphia he served as assistant pastor at St. Teresa's and St. Matthew's. Later he became Professor of Dogmatic Theology at St. Charles Seminary, a position which he resigned in 1903 in order to devote himself to work in the Phillipines. On February 14, 1909, he was consecrated Bishop of Nueva Segovia. The consecration took place in the Cathedral of Manila.

The first alumnus to be raised to the episcopal dignity was Rev. M. Ruiz y Rodriguez, who studied at the University, 1901-1903, and in 1903 obtained the degree of Licentiate in Theology. In June, 1907, he was consecrated second bishop of Pinar del Rio, Cuba. The consecration took place in the Cathedral of Cienfuegos, and the consecrator was Most Rev. Archbishop Aversa, Apostolic Delegate to Cuba.

NECROLOGY.

CHARLES WARREN STODDARD.

Dr. Charles Warren Stoddard who from 1890 to 1902 occupied the Chair of English Literature at the University died at Monterey, California, on Friday, April 23.

Charles Warren Stoddard was born in Rochester, N. Y., August 9, 1843. While still a child he moved with his parents to New York City, where he attended school until he was twelve years old. He spent the years 1856-7 in California, returning by way of Cape Horn to his home in New York. In 1859 he returned to California and remained there until 1864, when he went to Hawaii. In 1867, he came back to America and that same year was received into the Catholic Church at Old St. Mary's, San Francisco. During the next ten years he traveled in Europe, revisited the South Seas, and made another visit to Hawaii. In 1884 he accepted a position as Professor of English Literature at Notre Dame University, which he resigned in 1885. In 1889 he was made Professor of English Literature at the Catholic University of America. He taught here from 1890 to 1902. He left on account of ill-health, and was very much regretted by all who knew him. In 1905 he settled down at Monterey, California, where he died April 23.

Dr. Stoddard is well known as the author of *South Sea Idylls*, *A troubled Heart and how it was Comforted* (a record of his conversion to the Catholic Faith), *Lazy Letters from Low Latitudes*, *The Wonder Worker of Padua*, *In the Footprints of the Padres*, etc. He was a man of extraordinary literary genius; as a stylist he has had few equals among contemporary writers of English. His devotion to the Catholic religion which was one of the most pleasing of his personal traits, colored every thought and every expression and imparted to his works a rare charm which is described as sweetness, peacefulness, tenderness, gentleness. On the students and professors of the Catholic University who had the privilege of knowing him he made an impression which time can with difficulty efface. Pure of heart, simple, truth-loving, loyal and devout, he was a most lovable companion and a true friend. May his gentle soul rest in peace.

UNIVERSITY CHRONICLE.

Very Rev. Daniel Joseph Kennedy, O. P., S. T. M., has been appointed by the Board of Trustees full professor of Sacramental Theology, and will assume that office in the coming scholastic year. Dr. Kennedy was born near Knoxville, Tenn., January 12, 1862. At an early age his aptitude and fondness for study were noticed by Rev. F. T. Marron and Rev. J. P. McClaney (now Dean of Middletown, N. Y.). They took charge of the boy's education, and with exceeding care and uncommon thoroughness prepared him for a theological career. Under them he acquired the mental habits which have ever since distinguished him. Eventually he entered the Dominican Order, and on November 10, 1877, made profession of his simple vows at St. Joseph's Convent, Somerset, Ohio. The following three years were spent in the study of philosophy, church history and canon law. In 1881 he was sent to Louvain, there to make a thorough course in Thomistic theology. At the Dominican House of Studies in Louvain he spent four years, and was fortunate enough to have among his professors the eminent theologians Lepidi and Dummermuth.

In September, 1884, he was ordained to the priesthood and on July 10 of the following year passed his examination at St. Joseph's Convent, Somerset, Ohio, for the degree of Lector of Sacred Theology.

In February, 1886, he was made Master of Novices at St. Joseph's, and held this position for four years. In 1890 he was called to the new University of Freiburg in Switzerland to fill the chair of Philosophy. In 1891 he returned to America to resume his position of Novice Master at St. Joseph's, and in July, 1894, was elected Prior of that Convent, which position he filled until 1905.

On July 28, 1898, he received the degree of Master of Sacred Theology, the highest academic degree which the Dominican Order confers. The reception of this degree presupposes thir-

teen years of actual teaching and an intermediate examination "ad gradus."

In 1885 a General Chapter of the Dominican Order was held at Louvain, and before it Father Kennedy defended a number of theses. He acquitted himself so well that he was dispensed from all future examinations prescribed by the Constitutions of the Order.

In 1896 he was made Regent of the "Studium Formale" of the Dominican Order, which Studium was in 1905 transferred from Somerset, Ohio, to Washington, D. C. Dr. Kennedy, however, remained Regent of Studies, a position which he yet holds.

In 1905 he was made Prior of the newly founded Convent of the Immaculate Conception, in the immediate vicinity of the Catholic University.

In October, 1906, he was appointed Lecturer on Sacramental Theology in the Catholic University.

Lectures by Professors. A Committee of Catholic Ladies of Washington, including Miss Alice Riggs, Miss Janie Riggs, Mrs. John T. Devine, Mrs. George Becker and the Misses Cul-len, under the presidency of Mrs. George M. Bolling arranged for a course of lectures at the Shoreham Hotel, Washington, during the Lent of 1909. The following are the dates and the subjects:

Friday, February 26th, 11 A. M.,

"Mind and Brain."

VERY REV. EDWARD A. PACE, D.D., Ph.D., Professor of Psychology.

Friday, March 12th, 11 A. M.,

"The Psychology of Suggestion."

VERY REV. EDWARD A. PACE, D.D., Ph.D., Professor of Psychology.

Wednesday, March 17th, 11 A. M.,

"Christ's Method of Teaching."

REV. THOMAS E. SHIELDS, Ph.D., Associate Professor of Pedagogy.

Wednesday, March 24th, 11 A. M.,

"The Church's Method of Teaching."

REV. THOMAS E. SHIELDS, Ph.D., Associate Professor of Pedagogy.

Wednesday, March 31st, 11 A. M.,

"Zoroastrianism Viewed in the Light of Christianity."

REV. CHARLES F. AIKEN, D.D., Professor of Apologetics.

At the suggestion of Miss Fannie Whelan, of Washington, a similar course was given at Boston. The ladies in charge of the local committees in Boston were Mrs. Rachel Sherman Thorndyke and Mrs. Charles Bruen Perkins. The Boston Course included:

March 4. "The Study of the Mind."

VERY REV. EDWARD A. PACE, D.D., Ph.D.

March 13. "The Pedagogical Benefits of the Organic teaching of the Church."

REV. THOMAS E. SHIELDS, Ph.D.

March 23. "Analysis of a poetic book of the Bible."

REV. CHARLES P. GRANNAN, D.D.

April 1. "Relations of Christianity with Buddhism."

REV. CHARLES F. AIKEN, D.D.

A series of Lectures on Psychology was delivered Monday evenings during Lent at Rauscher's by Very Reverend Edward A. Pace, Ph.D. The object of the course was to secure funds for founding a Scholarship at Trinity College to be known as the Anna Hanson Dorsey Scholarship. The organizer of the project and Chairman of the Committee of Arrangements was Mrs. Senator Thomas H. Carter, whose coöperation in every good work affecting the interests both of the University and of Trinity College entitles her to the gratitude of the friends of both institutions. The dates and subjects of the Lectures were as follows:

March 1. "The Scope and Field of Psychology."

March 8. "The Relations of Mind and Brain."

March 15. "Mental Development."

March 22. "Personality—One or Multiple."

March 29. "Hypnotism and its Meaning for Psychology."

April 5. "Psychology and Religion."

Gifts to the Library. Through the generosity of a number of the Most Reverend Archbishops, members of the Board of Trustees, and of Bishops Conaty and O'Gorman, Reverend Doctor Hyvernat has been able to secure for the University Library complete sets of the scientific publications of the Universities and learned societies of Berlin, Vienna, Göttingen, etc.

Reverend Edward Southgate, Pastor of St. Anthony's Church,

Brookland, D. C., presented to the Library a valuable collection of Orientalia and works on the Greek Orthodox Church.

Rt. Reverend Bishop O'Connell presented Furey's "Life of Leo XIII" (édition de luxe) and King's "Medieval Architecture and Art," 4 vols.

Very Rev. Thomas J. Shahan presented Murray's "Oxford Dictionary" and Bardenheuer's "Patrology" translated by V. Rev. Thomas J. Shahan.

Doctor Dunn presented a copy of "Vie de S. Patrice" par Joseph Dunn.

Very Rev. Dr. Pace. His Eminence Cardinal Gibbons was pleased to designate Very Rev. Dr. Pace as the representative of the University at the celebration of the seventy-fifth anniversary of the New Louvain. Dr. Pace sailed for Antwerp on the *Lapland*, April 24, and took part in the festivities of May 9, 10, and 11, by which all Catholic Belgium commemorated the re-opening of the great school which in former ages had done so much among them for religion, science, and fatherland. We give below the text of the Latin letter by which the Catholic University of America congratulated her elder sister of Louvain on the splendid success which has crowned the labors of three-quarters of a century:

RECTOR ET SENATUS
CATHOLICAE UNIVERSITATIS AMERICAE
RECTORI, DOCTORIBUS, ALUMNIS
UNIVERSITATIS LOVANIENSIS
S. P. D.

Litteras jucundissimas quibus nos sollemnium vestrorum participes esse jussistis summa cum delectatione accepimus. Quum enim ab instaurata Academia saeculo nondum expleto tot gesta praeclara jure memoria repetatis eorum et nos libenter recordamur. Non uni quidem patriae sed humano potius generi beneficia paravit Universitas vestra quatenus fidei praelucente doctrina humanas disciplinas excoluit omnes, nova simul et vetera de thesauro sapientiae protulit atque nobilem scientiae

cupiditatem ita excitavit ut florentissimam hominum doctorum segetem Christianae civilisque reipublicae emolumento praeberet.

Quod si haec omnia non sine labore et difficultate potuistis praestare, eo vel magis splendescit religionis studium quo clerus populusque istius regionis permoti ardua quaeque superaverunt. Idecirco Universitas ipsa tanquam munimentum firmissimum constituebatur in quo tuendae veritati bonisque servandis moribus praesidia usque validiora struerentur.

De tantis autem incrementis peculiari gratulamur ratione quia scilicet ab ipso instituti nostri exordio benevolentiae vestrae erga coeptum opus haud ambigua indicia dabatis. Licebat enim nobis uberrimos percipere fructus eorum quae sive ad leges academicas condendas sive ad disciplinas recte tradendas perutilia vobis rerum varietates expertis esse videbantur. Neque id sane praetereundum quod ex iis qui apud nos docendi funguntur munere plures enutrivit alma Lovaniensis mater, omnes amicitia fovit, roboravit exemplo.

Hisce igitur adducti vobiscum gaudemus simulque vota ex intimo facimus corde ut bonorum omnium Auctor laeta cuncta ac prospera vobis tribuat Deus atque vires perpetuo augeat quibus Ecclesiae, patriae, scientiae dediti ad majora etiam agenda valeatis.

Dabamus Washingtonii

a. d. XVIII Kal. Mai. MCMIX.

THOMAS JOSEPH SHAHAN,

h. t. Rector.

Examination for Doctorate in Theology. Rev. Nicholas A. Weber, S. M., S. T. L., of the Marist Seminary, Catholic University, passed his examinations for the doctorate in theology on Thursday, April 29. His printed dissertation, of about two hundred and fifty pages, is entitled: *A History of Simony in the Early Church from the beginning to the death of Charlemagne* (814). He also defended seventy-five theses, from all departments of theology. Besides the faculty of theology his examiners included Rev. Dr. Kennedy, O. P.; Rev. Dr. Lucas, of Pittston, Pa.; Rev. Dr. Fox, of St. Thomas' College, Catholic

University; Rev. Dr. Sauvage, of Holy Cross College, Catholic University; Rev. Father Vieban, S. S., of St. Mary's Seminary, Baltimore; Rev. Father Anton Lechert, of St. John Cantius College, Brookland, D. C.

Nicholas Aloysius Weber was born November 30, 1876, at Krautergersheim near Obernai (Alsace). He attended the public schools of his native place, and from 1890 to 1895 studied at the College of Differt (Belgium) conducted by the Marist Fathers. After a two years' course in philosophy at Paignton (England) he entered the novitiate of the Society of Mary at Lyons. From 1898 to 1901 he studied theology at the Marist College, Washington, D. C. During part of this period he also attended the lectures of the Very Rev. Dr. Charles P. Grannan at the Catholic University of America. He graduated S.T.B. at the latter institution in 1901 and was ordained to the priesthood the same year. He then taught for a year at the Marist College, Atlanta, Georgia. In 1902 he was appointed professor of Church History at the Marist College, Washington, D. C., a position which he still holds. From 1902 to 1904 he studied Church History and Dogma at the Catholic University of America, having as professors the Very Reverend Dr. Thomas J. Shahan and the Reverend Dr. Edmund T. Shanahan. After graduating as S.T.L. at the Catholic University in 1904, he taught, besides History, Apologetics at the Marist College until he was appointed in 1908 professor of Dogma at the same institution.

Rector of the University. On Thursday, May 27, letters were received from Rome appointing Very Reverend Dr. Shahan, Pro-Rector, to the position of Rector of the University.

